Subsidizing carbon sequestration via forestry in Maryland: A cost-benefit assessment by Hettich, Rachel C
Purdue University
Purdue e-Pubs
Open Access Theses Theses and Dissertations
Spring 2015
Subsidizing carbon sequestration via forestry in
Maryland: A cost-benefit assessment
Rachel C. Hettich
Purdue University
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_theses
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons, and the Forest Sciences Commons
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.
Recommended Citation
Hettich, Rachel C., "Subsidizing carbon sequestration via forestry in Maryland: A cost-benefit assessment" (2015). Open Access Theses.
504.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_theses/504





This is to certify that the thesis/dissertation prepared
By  
Entitled
For the degree of 
Is approved by the final examining committee: 
To the best of my knowledge and as understood by the student in the Thesis/Dissertation 
Agreement, Publication Delay, and Certification Disclaimer (Graduate School Form 32), 
this thesis/dissertation adheres to the provisions of Purdue University’s “Policy of 
Integrity in Research” and the use of copyright material.
Approved by Major Professor(s): 
Approved by:
Head of the Departmental Graduate Program Date
Rachel C. Hettich




Otto C. Doering III
Benjamin M. Gramig
Philip C. Abbott
Gerald E. Shively 4/28/2015
i 
 SUBSIDIZING CARBON SEQUESTRATION VIA FORESTRY IN MARYLAND: A 
COST-BENEFIT ASSESSMENT 
A Thesis 




Rachel C. Hettich  
In Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree 
of 











 I would first like to thank NASA (grant#: NNX13AP58G) for providing funding 
for this research and extending several opportunities for me to obtain data and conduct 
interviews in Maryland. Molly Brown and Vanessa Escobar of NASA supported me 
through on-going feedback and were also a personal inspiration to me every time I 
visited. Additionally, thank you to Rob Feldt and Dan Rider of the Maryland DNR and 
Tom Morgart of the NRCS for providing data and always responding to my pestering 
emails.  
 Thank you to my advisor, Dr. Philip Abbott, for guiding and supporting me through 
every step of this research. I have learned a tremendous amount from him and would also 
like to thank him for not only providing research guidance, but also guidance in life. My 
committee members, Dr. Benjamin Gramig and Dr. Otto Doering, have always been 
more than willing to provide support and guidance whenever I needed it. Also, a special 
thank you to Dr. Shady Atallah for letting me attend his course and teaching me more 
than I ever thought I would know about forestry. I could not have done this without them.  
 Lastly, thank you to my amazing cohort here at Purdue and my family who 
provided support from afar. You have all made my graduate school experience one I will 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ ix 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ x 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Motivation ............................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Research Objectives ............................................................................................. 2 
1.3 Highlights of Main Conclusions ........................................................................... 4 
1.4 Organization ......................................................................................................... 6 
CHAPTER 2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTRY ECONOMICS REVIEW.... 7 
2.1 Summary of Topics .............................................................................................. 7 
2.2 Social Cost of Carbon ........................................................................................... 8 
2.3 Carbon Markets .................................................................................................. 10 
2.4 Forestry in the Carbon Process ........................................................................... 14 
2.5 Forestry and Alternative Land Uses ................................................................... 17 
2.5.1 Private Costs of Forestry ............................................................................. 18 
2.5.2 Private Benefits of Forestry ........................................................................ 19 
2.5.3 Social Benefits of Forestry.......................................................................... 20 
2.6 Forestry Investment and Policy Literature ......................................................... 22 
CHAPTER 3. THE ROLE OF FORESTRY PROGRAMS IN MARYLAND’S 
CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES............................................................................... 26 
3.1 Maryland’s Climate Change Initiatives .............................................................. 26 
3.2 United States Forestry Cost-Share Programs ..................................................... 28 






                                                                                                                                 Page 
3.3.1 Woodland Incentive Program ..................................................................... 29 
3.3.2 Lawn to Woodland ...................................................................................... 31 
CHAPTER 4. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS APPLIED TO FORESTRY 
INVESTMENTS  ............................................................................................................. 33 
4.1 Components Critical to Forestry Investments .................................................... 33 
4.2 Discounting and its Impact on Forestry Investments ......................................... 33 
4.3 Determining the Optimal Rotation Length ......................................................... 35 
4.3.1 Biological Rotation ..................................................................................... 36 
4.3.2 Economic Rotation...................................................................................... 37 
4.4 The With and Without Analysis Process ............................................................ 39 
4.5 Forestry Investment Scenarios and Sensitivity Analysis .................................... 40 
CHAPTER 5. IMPROVING TIMBER MANAGEMENT: IMPLEMENTATION 
AND RESULTS  ............................................................................................................. 42 
5.1 Scenario Overview ............................................................................................. 42 
5.2 Loblolly Pine Growth Function .......................................................................... 43 
5.2.1 Growth without Pre-commercial Thinning ................................................. 43 
5.2.2 Growth with Pre-commercial Thinning ...................................................... 44 
5.3 Management Costs ............................................................................................. 46 
5.4 Optimal Rotation and Timber Benefits .............................................................. 47 
5.5 Woodland Incentive Program Participation ....................................................... 49 
5.6 Carbon Sequestration Benefits ........................................................................... 50 
5.7 Base Case Results ............................................................................................... 52 
5.8 Discount Rate Sensitivity Results ...................................................................... 53 
5.9 Pre-Commercial Thinning Cost Sensitivity Results ........................................... 54 
5.10 Carbon Price Sensitivity Results ........................................................................ 55 
CHAPTER 6. CONVERSION FROM AGRICULTURAL LAND TO FOREST: 
IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS ........................................................................... 59 
6.1 Scenario Overview ............................................................................................. 59 






                                                                                                                                        Page 
6.3 Land Conversion and Management Costs .......................................................... 62 
6.4 Optimal Rotation and Timber Benefits .............................................................. 64 
6.5 Environmental Quality Inventive Program Participation ................................... 65 
6.6 Agricultural Land Rent Benefits ........................................................................ 66 
6.7 Carbon Sequestration Benefits ........................................................................... 66 
6.8 Base Case Results ............................................................................................... 67 
6.9 Discount Rate Sensitivity Results ...................................................................... 67 
6.10 Pastureland Rent Sensitivity Results .................................................................. 68 
6.11 Carbon Price Sensitivity Results ........................................................................ 69 
CHAPTER 7. CONVERSION FROM LAWN TO FOREST: IMPLEMENTATION 
AND RESULTS  ............................................................................................................. 73 
7.1 Scenario Overview ............................................................................................. 73 
7.2 Establishment and Management Costs ............................................................... 74 
7.3 Lawn to Woodland Participation ........................................................................ 75 
7.4 Carbon Sequestration Benefits ........................................................................... 76 
7.5 Base Case Results ............................................................................................... 76 
7.6 Discount Rate Sensitivity Results ...................................................................... 77 
7.7 Carbon Price Sensitivity Results ........................................................................ 78 
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 82 
8.1 Overview of Conclusions ................................................................................... 82 
8.2 Improving Timber Management: Synthesis of Results ...................................... 83 
8.3 Conversion from Agricultural Land to Forest: Synthesis of Results ................. 84 
8.4 Conversion from Lawn to Forest: Synthesis of Results ..................................... 86 
8.5 Comparison of Carbon Sequestration Potential and Abatement Costs .............. 87 
8.6 Analysis Limitations ........................................................................................... 91 
8.7 Future Research and Recommendations ............................................................ 93 
LIST OF REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 95 







LIST OF TABLES 
Table .............................................................................................................................. Page 
Table 2.1 Annual Social Cost of Carbon Estimates, 2010-2050 ........................................ 9 
Table 2.2 Carbon Taxes around the World ....................................................................... 12 
Table 2.3 Carbon Prices from Cap-and-Trade Programs around the World .................... 13 
Table 2.4 Impact of Policy Variables on Reforestation Behavior .................................... 23 
Table 2.5 Impact of Policy Variables on Timber Stand Improvement Behavior ............. 24 
Table 4.1 Overview of Forestry Investment Scenarios ..................................................... 41 
Table 5.1 Loblolly Pine Volume Measures Used ............................................................. 45 
Table 5.2 Improving Timber Management Results: Base Case NPVs ............................. 53 
Table 5.3 Improving Timber Management Results: Difference in NPVs ($/acre) .......... 53 
Table 5.4 Improving Timber Management Results: Difference in NPVs for Different Pre-
Commercial Thinning Costs ............................................................................................. 54 
Table 5.5 Improving Timber Management Results: Difference in NPVs Including Carbon 
Benefits based on California Carbon Price ....................................................................... 55 
Table 5.6 Improving Timber Management Results: Difference in NPVs Including Carbon 
Benefits based on Social Cost of Carbon Estimates ......................................................... 56 
Table 5.7 Improving Timber Management Results: Comparison of Cost-Share Assistance 
based on Carbon Benefits ................................................................................................. 57 
Table 6.1 Oak/Hickory Volume Measures Used .............................................................. 61 
Table 6.2 Summary of Costs for Converting Agricultural Land to Forest ....................... 64 
Table 6.3 Conversion from Cropland to Forest Results: Base Case NPVs ...................... 67 
Table 6.4 Conversion from Cropland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs.................. 68 
Table 6.5 Conversion from Pastureland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs .............. 69 
Table 6.6 Conversion from Cropland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including 
Carbon Benefits based on California Carbon Price .......................................................... 70







Table                                                                                                                               Page 
Table 6.7 Conversion from Cropland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including 
Carbon Benefits based on Social Cost of Carbon Estimates ............................................ 70 
Table 6.8 Conversion from Pastureland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including 
Carbon Benefits from California Carbon Price ................................................................ 71 
Table 6.9 Conversion from Pastureland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including 
Carbon Benefits from Social Cost of Carbon Estimates ................................................... 71 
Table 6.10 Conversion from Agricultural Land to Forest Results: Comparison of Cost-
Share Assistance based on Carbon Benefits ..................................................................... 72 
Table 7.1 Summary of Costs for Converting Lawn to Forest ........................................... 75 
Table 7.2 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Base Case NPVs ............................ 76 
Table 7.3 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs ....................... 77 
Table 7.4 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including 
Carbon Benefits based on California Carbon Price .......................................................... 78 
Table 7.5 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including 
Carbon Benefits based on Social Cost of Carbon Estimates ............................................ 79 
Table 7.6 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: NPVs Including Carbon Benefits 
based on California Carbon Price ..................................................................................... 79 
Table 7.7 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: NPVs Including Carbon Benefits 
based on Social Cost of Carbon Estimates ....................................................................... 80 
Table 7.8 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Comparison of Cost-Share 
Assistance based on Carbon Benefits without Timber Harvest ........................................ 80 
Table 7.9 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Comparison of Cost-Share 
Assistance based on Carbon Benefits with Timber Harvest ............................................. 81 
Table 8.1 Carbon Sequestration Potential of Maryland’s Forestry Programs .................. 88 
Table 8.2 Effective Abatement Costs of Forestry Investments ........................................ 89 
Table 8.3 Break-Even Carbon Prices of Forestry Investments ......................................... 90 






LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure ............................................................................................................................. Page 
Figure 2.1 Simplified Carbon Process .............................................................................. 15 
Figure 3.1 Maryland’s Physiographic Provinces .............................................................. 27 
Figure 3.2 WIP Eligibility According to GIS Criteria ...................................................... 30 
Figure 3.3 L2W Eligibility According to GIS Criteria ..................................................... 32 
Figure 4.1 Representative Tree Growth Cycle ................................................................. 37 
Figure 4.2 Tree Volume Growth and the Optimal Rotations ............................................ 39 
Figure 5.1 Volume Curves for Loblolly Pine Stands: With and Without Pre-commercial 
Thinning ............................................................................................................................ 46 
Figure 6.1 Volume Curve for Oak/Hickory Stand ............................................................ 62 
Figure 8.1 Progression of Results ..................................................................................... 82 
Appendix Figures ..................................................................................................................  
Appendix Figure 1. Example WIP Analysis Results……..…………..…….…………...…107 










LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CARB  California Air Resources Board 
CBA   Cost Benefit Analysis 
CMS   Carbon Monitoring System 
DICE  Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy (IAM) 
DNR   Department of Natural Resources 
EPA   Environmental Protection Agency 
EQIP   Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
FUND   Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution 
(IAM) 
GHG   Greenhouse Gas 
GHGRP  Greenhouse Gas Reduction Act Plan 
GIS   Geographic Information Systems 
IAM   Integrated Assessment Model 
IPCC   Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
L2W   Lawn to Woodland 
LEV   Land Expectation Value 
MAI   Mean Annual Increment 
MBF   Thousand Board Feet 
MSY   Maximum Sustainable Yield 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NLCD  National Land Cover Dataset 
NPV   Net Present Value 
NRCS  Natural Resources Conversation Service 
PAGE  Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect (IAM) 
RGGI  Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
USDA  United States Department of Agriculture 









Hettich, Rachel C. M.S., Purdue University, May 2015. Subsidizing Carbon 
Sequestration via Forestry in Maryland: A Cost-Benefit Assessment. Major Professor: 
Philip Abbott.  
 
Carbon sequestration by forestry is one way to mitigate climate change, and policy 
incentives are in place to encourage private investment in forestry. State and federal 
forestry cost-share programs subsidize the establishment of trees and the improvement of 
existing forested land. The objective of this research was to determine the effectiveness 
of such programs in Maryland and to compare the monetized benefits from permanently 
sequestered carbon with the current subsidies. To meet this objective, private and social 
cost-benefit analyses were conducted for three forestry investment scenarios in Maryland 
that coincide with the main cost-share programs available there. Sensitivity analysis 
considered a range of values for the social cost of carbon, the discount rate, and program 
implementation costs.  
The first program considered was the state funded Woodland Incentive Program 
(WIP), which provides cost-share assistance for improving timber management. 
According to the cost-benefit analysis results, the program provides sufficient incentives 
to induce participation. For a discount rate of 5%, the investment in pre-commercial 
thinning with participation in WIP increases discounted returns by $60.62 per acre. 
However, the total program enrollment over the past eight years was only 24,443 acres, 
compared to GIS analysis results that show approximately 737,000 acres across Maryland 
are eligible for the program. The total cost share assistance provided by WIP for a timber 
management improvement practice of pre-commercial thinning was $81.34 per acre, 
while from society’s view, the discounted carbon sequestration benefits provided by the 






carbon benefits, and so increasing the subsidies, potential and actual program 
participation may converge.  
Two land conversion programs were considered: the federally funded Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the state funded Lawn to Woodland (L2W) 
Initiative. The cost-benefit analysis results show that the conversion from cropland to 
forest through EQIP does not provide enough incentive to induce program participation. 
Cropland rents generate income far greater than the benefits from forestry conversion, 
even when carbon benefits are included. In this case, the program is already providing 
subsidies larger than the carbon sequestration benefits, and the actual participation of 
only 344 acres between 2009 and 2013 is still very low. However, when using the 
pastureland rent, which is about half of the cropland rent, the conversion to forest is much 
more likely. There are around 750,000 acres of pastureland in Maryland that could be 
converted to forest to increase carbon sequestration across the state. 
The conversion from lawn to forest through L2W provided contrasting results. Since 
timber harvest is unlikely following the conversion from lawn to forest, the carbon 
benefits are much higher. The cost-share assistance was $335.91 per acre, and the 
discounted carbon benefits from the conversion were $1,245.87 per acre. Cost-share 
assistance based on the benefits from permanently sequestered carbon could justify 
increasing the incentive to participate by almost four times. Since neither land use in this 
scenario provides financial returns to the owner, the investment decision depends largely 
on the aesthetic values of lawn versus forest that the landowner possesses, which are 
difficult to estimate. GIS analysis estimated that approximately 230,000 acres are eligible 
for this new program across Maryland.  
Maryland is at the forefront when compared to other states, supplementing federal 
cost-share programs with its own resources to combat climate change. This analysis 
suggests the state financed initiatives may exhibit the potential to enhance carbon 
sequestration more than the federal programs, and for each state program there was scope 






CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and their impact on climate change 
have emerged as key political and economic topics in the United States and around the 
world. The impact of GHG emissions on climate change depends on several factors, 
including land use allocation and natural resource management (National Research 
Council, 2010). For example, maintaining existing forests and establishing new forests 
are two ways to mitigate the negative effects of GHG emissions because forests can 
sequester and store carbon.  
Forests provide many co-benefits in addition to carbon sequestration, such as 
improved water quality, improved air quality, wildlife habitat, recreational opportunities, 
and aesthetics. The value of these non-market benefits can be estimated, but private forest 
owners do not receive full financial compensation equal to the benefits they provide to 
society. In other words, the positive externalities that the forest owner provides to society 
are not fully internalized. Subsidies offered by government sponsored forestry cost-share 
programs help make it less costly for landowners to plant and maintain trees. However, it 
is not evident whether the subsidies are adequate to overcome the opportunity costs from 
investing in forestry. Moreover, social benefits from the positive externalities provided 
by forestry may justify larger subsidies that would elicit greater program participation.  
Through cost-benefit analysis (CBA), this research compares the profitability of 
owning forestland, including the possibility of participating in a government cost-share 
program, with other land use alternatives such as agriculture or lawn space. Further, a 
CBA from society’s perspective1, including the internalization of carbon sequestration  
1. I did not attempt to fully internalize the social value of all co-benefits from forestry 
investments. Prior literature does not provide good estimates of the value of these benefits in 






benefits, was conducted to compare current cost-share assistance with the societal carbon 
benefits. The focus is on forestry cost-share programs implemented in the state of 
Maryland.  
Maryland is at the forefront in addressing climate change on a broad scale, and 
especially when it comes to dedicating time and money to conserving its forests and 
providing incentives for landowners to do the same. 40% of Maryland’s land is currently 
forested, and the state Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has implemented many 
measures to maintain or expand this forest cover. For example, the Woodland Incentive 
Program (WIP) provides cost sharing to private woodland owners for planting new trees 
and implementing practices that improve existing timber stands (Maryland Forest 
Service, 2008). Another new program in Maryland is the Lawn to Woodland Initiative 
(L2W), which offers private landowners the opportunity to convert their existing lawn to 
trees at no cost to them (Maryland Forest Service, 2014).  
These state forestry cost-share programs, along with federal programs administered 
by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), serve as part of a larger GHG 
Emissions Reduction Act Plan (GHGRP), passed in 2012, which established an overall 
goal to reduce GHG emissions by 25% (using 2006 as the base year) in Maryland by 
2020 (Department of the Environment, 2013). The forestry and sequestration efforts are 
projected to result in a reduction of 4.56 million metric tons of carbon, which is 8.2% of 
the total reduction goal.  
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The aim of this study is first to evaluate whether landowners will invest in forestry 
with and without participation in a cost-share program. In other words, the analysis 
attempts to answer the question of whether the current subsidies are large enough to elicit 
program participation from private landowners. Next, this research evaluates whether 
larger subsidies would be justified by internalizing the carbon sequestration benefits the 
public receives from the forestry investments. Larger subsidies may be required to 






assess the potential for these forestry efforts to make a difference in the fight against 
climate change in Maryland. 
The analysis conducted consists of three forestry investment scenarios that align 
with the three main forestry cost-share programs available to private landowners in 
Maryland. The first investment scenario is a landowner that owns a loblolly pine stand 
that is at the appropriate age to be pre-commercially thinned. Pre-commercial thinning is 
a timber management improvement practice that is eligible for WIP, which is the forestry 
cost-share program for this scenario. The next two scenarios are similar in that they both 
consider converting land to forest. One investigates the conversion of agricultural land to 
an oak/hickory forest, and the other looks at the conversion of lawn to a red oak forest. 
Tree establishment on cropland is a conservation practice that is eligible for the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), which is administered by the USDA 
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), and tree establishment on lawns is the 
purpose of the new L2W program in Maryland.  
The net present value (NPV), which is the discounted value of a stream of annual 
net revenues, is calculated for a base case in each scenario, which is the case without the 
forestry investment in question. Next, the NPV is calculated assuming the landowner 
makes the forestry investment under two cases: with participation in a forestry cost-share 
program and without participation. Each of the NPVs are then calculated including 
potential financial compensation for the value of permanently sequestered carbon that 
results from the forestry investment. Sensitivity analyses are conducted to address 
uncertainty in the appropriate discount rate, carbon prices, social cost of carbon 
estimates, and scenario-specific elements.  
To provide an idea of the scope of forestry cost-share programs in Maryland, 
geographic information systems (GIS) analysis was also conducted, which ties in with 
another motivation for this research. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) provided funding for this research as part of its Carbon Monitoring Systems 
(CMS) program. Dubayah, Hurtt, Huang, and Swatantran (2013) participated in the CMS 
program and developed several GIS data layers for the state of Maryland that report the 






combination of other analyses, carbon sequestration potential of the land in Maryland 
was also calculated. There are various uses of the data produced by Dubayah et al. 
(2013), including using the data to monitor the success of forestry cost-share programs or 
to target eligible landowners. For this research, the data were used in the GIS analysis to 
estimate the total land in Maryland that is eligible for the forestry cost-share programs 
included in this research and the carbon sequestration potential should full program 
participation be achieved. The results of the GIS analysis provide another element to 
compare the actual and predicted program participation with the overall program 
potential.  
 
1.3 Highlights of Main Conclusions 
For the improving timber management scenario, pre-commercial thinning 
accelerates stand growth, which also accelerates carbon sequestration. For these reasons, 
the investment is definitely positive from a societal view, and it is positive from a private 
view if the additional timber benefits outweigh the pre-commercial thinning costs. At a 
discount rate of 5% (a typical private discount rate) and no participation in WIP, the 
benefits from pre-commercial thinning do not outweigh the costs. However, with cost-
share assistance from WIP, the investment in pre-commercial thinning is worth it, even at 
a discount rate of 5%. WIP seems to be providing enough incentive for landowners to 
choose to improve timber management, and investing more in this program could 
increase carbon sequestration. The results of the GIS analysis estimate that around 
737,000 acres of land in Maryland are eligible for WIP. However, from 2007 to 2014, 
only 814 landowners have participated in the program for improved management 
practices on 24,443 acres. Using the constant social cost of carbon estimate at a discount 
rate of 2.5% (a typical social discount rate), the carbon benefits provided by the improved 
timber management over the investment horizon are worth $146.82 per acre, while the 
current cost-share assistance is only $81.34 per acre. While the program already appears 
to provide the correct incentives to induce landowner participation, the actual 
participation may be increased by basing the cost-share assistance on benefits from 






For the conversion from cropland to forest scenario, the NPVs with annual 
collection of cropland cash rent are significantly higher than those of converting to forest, 
even with the cost-share assistance from EQIP. The NPVs are positive in all cases when 
the land is converted to forest, but they are not large enough to cover the opportunity cost 
of converting from agriculture. Even with the inclusion of carbon benefits, the landowner 
would likely not choose to convert their land to forestry. When the pastureland rent is 
used instead of the cropland rent, the NPVs from converting and participating in EQIP 
are higher than those without conversion for discount rates of both 2.5% and 3%. From 
2009 to 2013, tree stand establishments have been conducted on 344 acres in Maryland, 
which is a small number as predicted by the analysis results. Perhaps by targeting 
marginal cropland or pastureland, the program would have greater participation for tree 
establishment practices. 
For the conversion from lawn to forest scenario, the NPVs from converting to 
forest are substantially higher than those of maintaining lawn, even without harvesting 
any timber. The costs of managing a forest are much lower than those of managing a 
lawn. The decision of the landowner to participate in L2W and establish trees on their 
lawn space is largely determined by the aesthetic values of the landowner. Since it seems 
unlikely that the landowner would choose to harvest timber from one acre of trees, 
neither land use provides market benefits to the landowner, making the aesthetic benefits 
very important. The internalization of public benefits from carbon sequestration would 
make the investment in converting to forest even more attractive to the landowner. Using 
the constant social cost of carbon estimate discounted at 2.5%, the discounted carbon 
benefits provided by the conversion are worth $1,245.87 per acre when no timber is 
harvested, which is substantially higher than the current cost-share assistance of $335.91 
per acre. The GIS analysis results estimate that around 230,000 acres of land in Maryland 
are eligible for L2W, which is much lower than the one million acre estimate set forth 
when the program was first launched. Since the program is new, no conclusions can be 
made regarding actual versus potential program participation, but the initial enrollment 






not already been forested, investing more in L2W could accelerate Maryland’s progress 
towards its GHG reduction goals. 
Overall, several cases resulted where the NPV from the forestry investment did not 
exceed the opportunity costs using only private benefits and a typical private discount 
rate of 5%, but with a discount rate of 2.5% and carbon benefits included, the opportunity 
costs were exceeded. This represents a situation where the forestry investment is valuable 
to society, but from a private perspective, the landowner would likely not make the 
investment. The question of whether the government should make up the difference in 
order to induce the private landowner to invest and ultimately better society is raised 
from these results. Further, this question arises only with the internalization of one of the 
co-benefits (carbon sequestration), and in reality, the social benefits from forestry would 
be much more extensive. 
 
1.4 Organization 
The next chapter provides a review of climate change and forestry economics. The 
chapter includes topics such as the state of carbon prices around the globe, forestry’s role 
in the carbon cycle, and land use alternatives. Chapter Three presents an in-depth 
explanation of Maryland’s climate change initiatives and the role that forestry plays. 
Further, a detailed description of the forestry cost-share programs used for this analysis is 
laid out, including the results of the GIS analysis conducted to determine program 
eligibility across Maryland. Chapter Four discusses elements of CBA that are particularly 
important to analyzing forestry investments such as discounting and optimal timber 
rotations. Chapters Five, Six, and Seven explain the implementation of the three forestry 
investment scenarios and the results from each. Specifically, Chapter Five presents the 
improving timber management scenario and evaluates WIP, Chapter Six presents the 
conversion from agricultural land to forest scenario and evaluates EQIP, and Chapter 
Seven presents the conversion from lawn to forest scenario and evaluates L2W. Lastly, 
Chapter Eight provides a synthesized set of conclusions that use the CBA results, 
observed program participation, and the GIS analysis results. It also includes a discussion 






CHAPTER 2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTRY ECONOMICS REVIEW 
2.1 Summary of Topics 
According to the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) most recent 
assessment report, concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have increased by 
40% compared to pre-industrial levels, which is just one of many statistics that brings to 
light the global carbon problem our world is currently facing (IPCC, 2013). Preventing 
the problem from escalating and searching for a global solution have been important 
topics in the political arena for over 20 years. A working group consisting of several 
agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has been conducting 
ongoing research since 2010 to estimate the social cost of carbon, which is used to 
measure the benefits of carbon reductions in regulatory impact analyses (Interagency 
Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013). Further, economies around the world 
have implemented carbon pricing approaches to internalize the external costs of carbon 
emissions, which is an important step towards mitigating climate change (World Bank & 
ECOFYS, 2014). 
One way that carbon in the atmosphere can be decreased is by sequestration, which 
is the process of capturing and storing carbon.. Sequestration by forests plays an 
important role in the carbon cycle, and increasing forested land is another component of 
the fight against climate change (Richardson & Macauley, 2012). However, since several 
alternative land uses to forestry exist, the costs and benefits that play a part in private 
land use decisions must be considered (Liu, Merrill, Gold, Kellogg, & Uchida, 2013). 
These topics will be covered in the following literature review to provide context for the 







2.2 Social Cost of Carbon 
Estimates of the social cost of carbon vary immensely in the literature, depending 
on what model is used and what assumptions are made. According to the interagency 
working group discussed previously that includes the EPA, the definition of the social 
cost of carbon is the “estimate of the economic damages associated with a small increase 
in carbon emissions, conventionally one metric ton, in a given year.” Some of the 
damages it includes are “changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, property 
damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services due to climate 
change” (Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013). The interagency 
group establishes four values for the social cost of carbon, which are based on the 
average results of three well-known integrated assessment models (IAMs). The three 
models are the Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy (DICE) model, first presented 
by Nordhaus (1994), the Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE) model, first 
presented by Hope, Anderson, and Wenman (1993), and the Climate Framework for 
Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution (FUND) model, first presented by Tol (1997).  
Pindyck (2013) defined IAMs as models that combine a climate science model with 
an economic model. There are six main elements to the common IAMs (DICE, PAGE, 
and FUND): future carbon emissions projections, future atmospheric carbon projections, 
projections of climate changes as a result of higher carbon concentrations, economic 
impacts from higher temperature projections, abatement cost estimates, and utility and 
time preferences. The modeler has freedom to specify key components of the model, 
generally requiring strong assumptions regarding the functional forms and parameter 
values, which is why the models produce differing results.  
The models vary in how temperature changes are translated into economic damages 
(Greenstone, Kopits, & Wolverton, 2013). PAGE includes damages in three broad 
categories, while FUND and DICE include damages in several narrower categories. 
PAGE and DICE both include the possibility of catastrophic higher temperatures, while 
FUND does not. Another variation between the three models is in how they account for 
adaptation as a response to climate change. FUND induces adaptation practices in certain 






for adaptation. Overall, PAGE and DICE produce similar estimates of the social cost of 
carbon, while FUND estimates are generally much lower.  
Table 2.1 below shows the most recent estimates of the social cost of carbon from 
2010 to 2050 using three different discount rates (2.5%, 3%, and 5%). These estimates 
are used by the United States government in project and policy assessments. As Table 2.1 
shows, the social cost of carbon estimates increase over time. This is the case because 
“future emissions are expected to produce larger incremental damages as physical and 
economic systems become more stressed in response to greater climate change” 
(Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013, p. 14).  
Table 2.1 Annual Social Cost of Carbon Estimates, 2010-2050 
(2007 $/ton) 





                                                










(Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013) 
As one can see in Table 2.1, the discount rate chosen has quite an impact on the 
social cost of carbon. The discount rate reflects the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption now and consumption in the future, and it used to calculate the net present 
value of a stream of future damages (Greenstone et al., 2013). The common discount 
rates used by government agencies are 2.5%, 3%, and 5%. The two higher discount rates 
are determined by historical interest rates. Since there is a popular concern that interest 
rates are uncertain in the future, the low discount rate is included as well. As the discount 
Discount Rate 
Year 
5.0% 3.0% 2.5% 
2010 11 32 51 
2015 11 37 57 
2020 12 43 64 
2025 14 47 69 
2030 16 52 75 
2035 19 56 80 
2040 21 61 86 
2045 24 66 92 






rate increases, the future becomes less important in the calculation. For example, the 
social cost of carbon in 2010 is $11 per ton using 5% as the discount rate and $51 per ton 
using 2.5%, which is a difference of $40. The power of discounting can make a drastic 
difference in calculating the damage caused by carbon emissions.  
Which discount rate to use causes a lot of disagreement about which social cost of 
carbon is accurate. Further, the limitations of IAMs are believed to underestimate the true 
damage caused by increased carbon emissions (Stern, 2013). Overall, the models have 
remained mostly the same since their development. For example, weak damage functions 
have continued to prevail as the models have evolved despite advancements in research 
about the impacts of climate change. Greenstone et al. (2013) pointed out that the IAMs 
do not include inter-sectoral or inter-regional relationships. For example, the damages in 
one region on a neighboring region are not captured. Further, the IAMs do not account 
for changes in technology that will decrease the costs of adaptation practices over time. 
Moore and Diaz (2015) recently published the results of their modified DICE model, 
which was altered to include the impact of increasing temperature on long-run GDP 
growth. They concluded that the social cost of carbon is actually as high as $220 per ton. 
Several limitations to IAMs can be discussed, but the important takeaway is that 
researchers are continually working to increase the accuracy of the social cost of carbon 
estimates and lower the discrepancy between estimates.   
 
2.3 Carbon Markets 
Carbon markets exist to internalize the externality of carbon emissions 
(MacKenzie, 2009). Without them, emitters do not have to bear the full cost of the 
external damage they cause to society. Carbon pricing instruments include carbon taxes 
and cap-and-trade schemes, and carbon markets use one of these approaches or a 
combination of both. The majority of carbon prices that have recently emerged from 
carbon markets are much lower than the social cost of carbon estimates discussed in the 
previous section. The social cost of carbon estimates the damage from future carbon 
emissions. In contrast to the social cost of carbon, carbon prices that have emerged from 






of carbon is the damage if we do nothing, and the carbon price is the cost to do something 
now. The relatively low carbon prices are an indication of the value of mitigating now to 
avoid the higher cost of damages in the future.  
Cap-and-trade starts with the government setting a ‘cap,’ which is a maximum 
amount of aggregate total emissions (MacKenzie, 2009). A corresponding number of 
permits is distributed, either by giving them away or selling them at an auction. The 
‘trade’ part comes in when firms buy and sell permits with each other depending on how 
much it costs them to reduce emissions compared to other firms. The price of carbon 
depends on how severe the cap is and it reflects to some extent the cost of reducing 
carbon. As the cap increases, allowing more emissions, the price of carbon decreases. 
Similarly, as the cap tightens, the price of carbon increases. Another important part of 
emissions trading schemes is the inclusion of offset credits. Offset credits are given for 
projects that reduce carbon emissions in one area in order to allow emissions in another 
area. Examples are the development of renewable energy, increased energy efficiency, 
and land-use change. An offset project of specific importance to this research is that of 
forestry offsets. 
Using a carbon tax allows the carbon price to be set by the government through 
policy at a certain amount (World Bank & ECOFYS, 2014). Using the well-known 
Pigouvian approach, the optimal carbon tax should be set equal to its marginal social 
damage (Cremer, Gahvari, & Ladoux, 1998). This would mean that the carbon tax should 
be set to equal the governmental social cost of carbon estimate, but this has not happened 
because of uncertainty in markets and the social cost of carbon estimates themselves. 
Carbon taxes are often used in areas where there are not a large enough number of 
emitters to have a successful trading scheme. They are also used in conjunction with 
emissions trading approaches. For example, carbon taxes are combined with offset credits 
in South Africa and Mexico. Unique carbon market designs that blend different pricing 
approaches are essential for finding the most effective and efficient way to run a carbon 
market.  
Different approaches produce vastly different carbon prices internationally. For 






Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeastern United States sells carbon credits for around $3 per 
ton (World Bank & ECOFYS, 2014). The carbon prices from the 2014 World Bank 
Group Report for different economies around the world are included in the Table 2.2 and 
Table 2.3 below. Table 2.2 shows the carbon taxes set by governments, some of which 
have lower and upper limits as shown. Table 2.3 shows the carbon prices that have 
emerged from cap-and-trade schemes. The carbon price in Japan of $95 per ton is an 
outlier, which is attributed to the fact that no excess credits were sold when the market 
was implemented, so no trading was possible.  
Table 2.2 Carbon Taxes around the World 
($ per ton of carbon) 
Region Carbon Tax 
Sweden 168 




British Columbia, Canada 28 
Ireland 28 
Australia 22 
United Kingdom 16 
France 10 
Iceland 10 
South Africa 5 
Mexico 1-4 
Japan 2 












Table 2.3 Carbon Prices from Cap-and-Trade Programs around the World 
($ per ton of carbon) 
Region Carbon Price 
Tokyo 95 
California, United States 11 
Shenzhen, China 11 
Guangdong, China 10 
Quebec, Canada 10 
Beijing, China 9 
European Union 9 
Shanghai, China 5 
Tianjin, China 4 
RGGI, United States 3 
New Zealand 1 
                                   (World Bank & ECOFYS, 2014) 
The two emissions trading schemes within the United States are in California and 
in the Northeastern region (RGGI). The California Cap-and-Trade Program was 
established in 2012, and the first compliance period began on January 1, 2013 (World 
Bank & ECOFYS, 2014). Carbon offsets are sold within the continental United States 
and Quebec. Carbon permits were initially allocated by the government to large entities 
based on production and efficiency, and the rest are auctioned off periodically. The 
original emissions cap was set 2% below the 2012 forecast of emissions, and it was set to 
decline 2% in 2014 and 3% in 2015 (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012). The carbon price at the 
beginning of 2012 was $15.40, which spiked at the end of July and then steadily 
decreased to around $11 by the end of 2012 (Climate Policy Iniative, 2015). In 2013, the 
price increased to $16.40 at the beginning of January but decreased back to around $11 
by the end of the year. At the beginning of 2015, the carbon price was $13.02, and has 
remained steady since then. The GHG Reduction Fund in California receives the auction 
proceeds, which are used to reach three main goals: sustainability in communities, clean 






RGGI, launched in 2009, is a market-based program designed to reduce carbon 
emissions from power plants in the following nine states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont 
(World Bank & ECOFYS, 2014). In 2014, a new emissions cap of 91 million tons of 
carbon was implemented, which is 45% less than the previous cap set in 2012. The cap 
was lowered so substantially because the actual emissions had consistently been about 
35% lower than the earlier cap. The cap will decline by 2.5% annually from 2015 to 
2020. Most emission allowances are sold through auctions, and the proceeds are invested 
to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy. The clearing price for the first 
auction in September of 2008 was $3.07, which steadily decreased to around $1.90 by the 
end of 2009 and stayed about the same until the end of 2012 (RGGI Inc., 2015). At the 
beginning of 2013, the price started to increase, and the most recent auction in March of 
2015 cleared at $5.41. 
Both the RGGI and the California Cap-and-Trade Program incorporate forestry 
offsets into their initiatives, which the next section discusses. 
 
2.4 Forestry in the Carbon Process 
While the main focus of climate change legislation tends to be the reduction of new 
emissions, forestry plays a unique role in that it reduces carbon that is already in the 
atmosphere. Forested lands possess the ability to sequester carbon from the atmosphere, 
making them a valuable resource in the climate change arena. “Carbon sequestration is 
the process of capture (through photosynthesis) and long-term storage of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide” (Sedjo & Sohngen, 2012, p. 128).  
The carbon sequestration process in forests takes place within tree biomass, which 
is defined as “any part of living or nonliving tree tissue, for example, the trunk, branches, 
leaves, or roots” (Sedjo & Sohngen, 2012, p. 128). The walls of plant cells are comprised 
of cellulose or lignin, and carbon is needed to build these fibers. Plants sequester carbon 
for this purpose through photosynthesis, which is critical for plant growth. Carbon is also 
sequestered by the soils of forestland through two processes: humification and 






into the soil, and microphotosynthesis occurs when photosynthetic bacteria in the soil 
itself sequesters carbon from the atmosphere. Existing forests can be managed to increase 
carbon sequestration in several ways such as extending harvest rotations or ensuring that 
carbon storage is maintained in wood products after harvest (Cunha-e-Sa, Rosa, & Costa-
Duarte, 2013).  
It is important to note that some of the sequestered carbon is released back into the 
atmosphere during harvest or when the tree dies and starts to decompose. Exactly how 
the forestry carbon cycle works depends on the tree species, the management practices 
used, the rotation length, and the use for harvested wood. If the timber is burned for fuel, 
the carbon will be released back into the atmosphere, but if it is used for building 
furniture or houses, the carbon remains sequestered. Figure 2.1 shows a simplified 
version of how vegetation sequesters and releases carbon through different facets.  






Since forestry is an important carbon sink, it makes sense that it would be included 
in carbon markets as an offset option. RGGI allows forest offset projects in the form of 
reforestation, improved forest management, avoided conversion, and afforestation (RGGI 
Inc., 2013). Reforestation is when trees are established on land that had recently been 
forested, and afforestation is when trees are established on land that was not previously 
forested. All offset projects must be in one of the nine RGGI states, but afforestation is 
only eligible in Connecticut and New York. Offset credits are awarded based on the net 
additional tons of carbon sequestered within the project boundary for each period. The 
California Cap-and-Trade Program allows the following forest offset projects: 
reforestation, improved forest management, and avoided conversion (Air Resources 
Board, 2011). The forestry projects can be located anywhere within the United States. 
Like RGGI, the offset credits are awarded based on any carbon sequestered in addition to 
a “business-as-usual” scenario. Protocols exist to establish the amount of carbon 
sequestered as a result of the various forestry offsets.  
Even though forestry offsets are included in many carbon markets, many 
challenges have arisen in their implementation. The first is additionality, which is the 
requirement that the emissions reductions (sequestration) would not have taken place if it 
were not for the offset project (Chomitz, 2000). A common example of a project where 
additionality is questionable is one where the project makes money and would be 
implemented with or without the offset program. The second challenge is determining the 
baseline “business as usual” scenario because so many different scenarios could take 
place in absence of the project. Similarly, the third challenge is the measurement of 
carbon sequestered with the project. Monitoring the progress of the offset project can 
become very costly. Finally, permanence is of concern because of the possibility of 
carbon sequestration being reversed, whether it is accidental or deliberate. Even though 
the challenges seem great, forestry cannot be ignored as valuable offset option and an 







2.5 Forestry and Alternative Land Uses 
As discussed above, forestland is valuable in the fight against climate change, but 
that does not guarantee that it is a profitable land use choice for a private landowner. One 
must consider alternative land uses such as agriculture and urban development. 
Urbanization in the eastern United States is causing a decline in agricultural and forest 
lands (Liu et al., 2013). With the loss of agricultural and forest lands also comes losses in 
ecosystem services like water filtration, wildlife habitat, and carbon storage. Private 
landowners have an incentive to provide private goods such as crops and timber, but they 
do not necessarily have incentives to preserve ecosystem services that benefit society 
since the positive social externalities are not internalized by the landowner.  
One way to incentivize private landowners to provide ecosystem services is by 
public policy. In the design of public policy, it is important to consider tradeoffs between 
alternative land uses when thinking of ways to preserve ecosystem services (Liu et al., 
2013). For example, conversion to forestland improves water quality and sequesters 
carbon, but it also takes land away from development and other agricultural uses. 
Urbanization and crop production play an important role in regional economic growth, 
which cannot be ignored. Decision-makers need to have an assessment of the tradeoffs 
between multiple land uses and land management scenarios.  
Private landowners make land use decisions based on the net present value (NPV) 
of the future revenue streams from all land use options (Nelson & Hellerstein, 1997). 
Output quantities, input and output prices, and the discount rate are all part of 
determining the NPV for each land use. Plantinga, Mauldin, and Miller (1999) estimated 
land use shares by solving an individual landowner’s profit maximization problem in 
three states: Maine, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. They then used an econometric 
model to predict the estimated land use shares using rents from agriculture and forestry, 
land quality measures, and transportation costs as explanatory variables. Rents from 
forestry were measured as the NPV of future timber revenues per acre, and rents from 
agriculture were measured as the NPV of future crop or pasture revenues per acre. They 
used population density measures to explain the share of land that was developed. As 






land relative to forestland decreases, all else equal. The opposite is also true. 
Interestingly, changes in forest and agricultural rents did not appear to have a significant 
effect on the allocation of land to urban development.  
Since this research has a focus on forestry, the rest of this section further explains 
the costs and benefits associated with forestry ownership.  
2.5.1 Private Costs of Forestry 
There are two types of forest owners: industrial and nonindustrial. Industrial forest 
lands are managed for timber production, and they are typically owned by wood 
processing facilities (Newman & Wear, 1993). Owners of nonindustrial private forest 
(NIPF) land are likely to value non-timber benefits, such as hunting, aesthetics, and wind 
breaks, as highly as the timber production benefits. Newman and Wear (1993) compared 
the behavior of industrial and nonindustrial forest owners, and they find that 
nonindustrial owners still practice profit maximizing behavior. Both types of forest 
owners will be treated equally in this research, and the NPV that maximizes profit will be 
used to predict landowner decisions.  
Most of the private costs of forest ownership are incurred at the time of forest 
establishment. Site preparation includes clearing past logging residue, preparing 
seedbeds, and controlling for weeds (Bair & Alig, 2006). Planting costs include 
seedlings, shelters, stakes and other equipment. Seedlings can be planted by hand or with 
machines, which makes labor and fuel prices important factors for forest landowners as 
well. Costs besides those incurred during forest stand establishment depend on the 
intermediate management strategies chosen. Some examples of intermediate management 
costs are fire protection, thinning costs, boundary maintenance, management plans, 
herbicide and fertilizer treatments, pruning, harvesting costs, and surveying (Bair & Alig, 
2006). Certain costs can depend on the tree species. For example, seedling costs and 
fertilizer recommendations vary amongst species. The United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and several land grant university extension services publish periodic 
estimates of these costs. For this analysis, the extension services of the University of 
Maryland, Pennsylvania State, Virginia Tech, the University of Arkansas, and the 






Private landowners who want to dedicate their land to forestry may have access to 
government cost-share programs. Such programs are in place to provide incentives for 
landowners to dedicate their land to forestry because governments recognize the benefits 
that forests provide, including those that help in the fight against climate change (Kooten, 
Binkley, & Delcourt, 1995). This has a significant impact on the private costs of owning 
forest. In some cases, 100% of the establishment costs are covered by the cost-share 
program, making it much less costly for landowners. However, there are often constraints 
to participating in such programs, such as long-term time commitments and eligibility 
requirements. Details on the current forestry cost-share programs available to Maryland 
landowners are included in the next chapter.  
2.5.2 Private Benefits of Forestry 
The main benefit that arises from forestry is the revenue from harvesting timber, 
which can come from a commercial thinning or a final harvest. In estimating the benefits 
from timber harvest, it is important to understand the distinctions between different 
grades of timber and the prices associated with each. As a tree grows, its grade shifts 
from pulpwood to sawtimber to veneer (Jacobson, 2008). However, certain species will 
never reach the veneer grade, so that needs to be taken into account. Further, the species 
is important in determining what the timber will likely be used for, which drastically 
impacts the benefits from carbon sequestration. Tree growth data for this analysis was 
obtained from the Forest Research Group, which is a private research organization in 
Massachusetts, and from the United States Forest Service, which will be discussed in 
detail in later chapters. Prices are commonly given in terms of volume, which could be 
board feet, cords, or cubic feet. The most recent analysis of timber prices in the United 
States conducted by the USDA includes real price projections to 2050 for hardwood and 
softwood timber of different grades from different regions, which will be used in this 
analysis (Haynes, 2003). While this publication may seem outdated, comparisons 
between the price predictions and more recently observed prices provided some 







Another private benefit from forestry ownership is the aesthetic value of trees. The 
Forest Service conducts a National Woodland Owner Survey every year, which acts as a 
census of forest owners across the United States. When asked the question of the 
importance of owning trees to enjoy their beauty or scenery, approximately 70% of the 
forest owners that were surveyed answered “important” or “very important” (United 
States Forest Service, 2014). McPherson, Simpson, Peper, Maco, and Xiao (2005) 
included aesthetic benefits in their analysis of trees in five United States cities. They 
calculated aesthetic benefits based on the contribution of a large tree in the front yard to a 
house sale price in each city. Also, they take the distribution of street trees and the tree 
growth rates into account for each city. Annual aesthetic benefits per tree range from $21 
in Bismarck to $67 in Berkeley. These estimates are for urban trees, and this analysis is 
focused on rural trees, for which aesthetic values are more difficult to quantify. While 
timber revenues are much easier to monetize, aesthetic benefits are an important private 
benefit as well. Several other co-benefits from forestry are presented in the next section.  
2.5.3 Social Benefits of Forestry 
Public, or social, benefits from forestry ownership are extensive. Besides carbon 
sequestration, forests provide several co-benefits such as improved water quality, 
improved air quality, increased shade and reduction of building temperatures, energy 
savings, flood control, wildlife habitat preservation, and recreation opportunities. This 
section discusses the valuation techniques that have been used in the literature for carbon 
sequestration, improved air quality, and improved water quality as a result of forestry. 
As already discussed, trees can sequester carbon from the atmosphere and store it in 
their roots, trunks, branches and leaves over their lifetime. Nowak (1994b) conducted a 
valuation of the reduction in atmospheric carbon by urban forests in Chicago. First 
ground samples were collected for 8,996 trees in the study area including diameter at 
breast height (dbh), tree height, and species. Allometric equations, which are equations 
that relate the easily quantified characteristics of trees (such as height and species) with 
more difficult properties (such as biomass), were used to calculate biomass for each tree. 
Then, tree-growth was estimated based on measurement of growth increments. The 






1990’s that were measured to determine average annual growth for major tree species. 
The result estimated that 5.6 million tons of carbon is stored in Chicago’s trees. The total 
carbon storage can be monetized using the social costs of carbon estimates previously 
discussed. Nowak’s study illustrates the fact that estimating the benefits from carbon 
sequestration requires a large amount of ground sampling and historical growth data, 
which can be costly and difficult to obtain. However, governments rely on such measures 
for regulatory analysis, so these types of studies continue to be conducted.  
Trees improve air quality in several ways. First, they can lower building 
temperatures by shading, which can in turn lower building energy use (Nowak, 1994a). 
This decrease in energy use can decrease power plant emissions. Trees can also intercept 
particles from the atmosphere and absorb pollutants. Besides reducing carbon dioxide, 
trees can also help decrease carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide, 
and other particulate matter in the atmosphere. To estimate the removal of air pollutants 
by trees, one must know the rate at which the surface of a tree cleans a given pollutant 
from the air. Once the pollution removal by trees is known, the monetary value of the 
pollutants removed is calculated by using the costs for emission control. In other words, 
the cost of preventing the emission of the pollution by using control strategies is used as 
the value of the pollutant removal by trees. Nowak uses the following 1990 dollar values 
per metric ton of pollutant removed from the California Energy Commission: $490 for 
ozone, $920 for carbon monoxide, $1,307 for particulate matter, $1,634 for sulfur 
dioxide, and $4,412 for nitrogen dioxide. For an acre of trees in Chicago, the estimated 
annual monetary value of pollution removal was $61 in 1991. 
Improved water quality as a result of trees is often measured by the amount of 
stormwater runoff reduction and monetized by using the costs for controlling stormwater 
runoff. Stormwater runoff is the “second most common source of water pollution for 
lakes and estuaries and the third most common source for rivers nationwide (Xiao, 
McPherson, Simpson, & Ustin, 1998). Trees are capable of intercepting and storing 
stormwater, which reduces runoff volumes. One way to monetize the costs for controlling 
stormwater runoff is to sum the total money spent to store water in a basin instead 






maintenance, operations, and construction. McPherson et al. (2005) calculated a 
stormwater reduction benefit ranging from $31 per tree in Glendale to $89 per tree in 
Berkeley. Improved water quality also arises when forests filter pollutants such as 
nitrogen and phosphorus that come from agricultural activities (Norton & Fisher, 2000).  
The co-benefits from forestry are vast but very difficult to quantify and especially 
to monetize, which becomes a limitation to evaluating forestry investments. Further, 
many of the attempts to quantify co-benefits from forestry in the literature have been for 
urban forests, as was presented in this section. Since this analysis considers rural forestry 
investments, the estimates from the literature are not directly applicable. It is important to 
note that only the benefits from permanently sequestered carbon are included in this 
analysis, so the total social benefits from the forestry investments in question are likely 
higher than the ones calculated. 
 
2.6 Forestry Investment and Policy Literature 
Econometric studies that explain the behavior and management decisions of forest 
landowners and try to identify the determinants of certain forestry investments have been 
conducted in the literature. Additionally, researchers have investigated the impacts of 
government forestry programs on private landowner investment decisions. 
Beach, Pattanayak, Yang, Murray, and Abt (2005) combined results from 39 
econometric studies through a meta-analysis with the goal of identifying the determinants 
of forest management by nonindustrial private forest owners. The meta-analysis 
technique used was vote-counting, which is the process of categorizing the findings from 
each study (significantly positive, significantly, negative, or not significant for each 
variable) and the category with the most “votes” for each variable is determined to be the 
best representation. Most of the studies used in their meta-analysis were from the United 
States, with a few from other countries. The majority of the models were either binary 
choice models that estimated the probability of a forest landowner making a certain 
management decision (timber stand improvements, reforestation, or harvesting) or 
ordinary least squares regressions that estimated the influence of the independent 






They used the following categorization of the determinants of forest management 
decisions: market drivers, policy variables, owner characteristics, and plot conditions. 
The main market driver that most studies included was timber prices, and surprisingly, 
the percentage of studies that found a significantly positive effect on forest management 
investment was lower than they expected. Plot size seemed to have a consistently positive 
and significant effect on forest management investment, but owner characteristics did not 
provide conclusive results across management practices. This suggests that forestry cost-
share programs might receive higher acreage participation if they were targeted towards 
large landowners 
The policy variables are of special importance to this analysis. Tax incentives, cost-
share programs, and technical assistance are typical examples of policy variables 
included in the analysis of forestry investments. Beach et al. (2005) found that policy 
variables were rarely included in harvesting studies, which makes sense since the purpose 
of such programs is usually to incentivize reforestation and timber stand improvements, 
not necessarily harvesting. The results regarding the impact of policy variables on the 
decision to reforest or improve timber stands are shown in Table 2.3 and 2.4. A total of 
16 reforestation studies and five timber stand improvement studies were used 
Overall, they concluded that more empirical analyses found that landowners 
respond to government programs than found that landowners respond to other factors, 
such as market prices. However, the results showed that the frequency of significance 
was higher for reforestation than for timber stand improvement. This may indicate that 
cost-share assistance for reforestation would result in higher participation than for timber 
stand improvements.  





Inclusion in Studies 
Frequency of Positive Significance 
(Out of total studies that included each 
variable) 
Cost-Share 80% 100% 
Technical Assistance 29% 100% 
Tax Incentives 18% 67% 











Inclusion in Studies 
Frequency of Positive Significance 
(Out of total studies that included each 
variable) 
Cost-Share 50% 50% 
Technical Assistance 60% 67% 
Tax Incentives 20% 100% 
(Beach et al., 2005) 
Most agree that government cost-share programs have a positive impact on the 
forestry industry since timber production is a long-term commitment and incentives may 
be required to encourage investment by landowners. However, some argue that such 
programs do not induce additional investments in such activities as reforestation and 
improved timber management, but instead, they replace the private capital that would 
have been invested anyway. de Steiguer (1984) examined data from the participation of 
10 states in two federal government forestry cost-share programs, the Federal Incentives 
Program and the Agricultural Conservation Payments Program, to determine whether 
these programs induced additional investments in forestry. Using regression analysis, he 
estimated total private autonomous investment in tree planting as a function of personal 
income, expected stumpage prices, expected interest rates, and total cost-share money 
available for tree planting from the two cost-share programs mentioned above. He found 
no evidence of capital substitution, and therefore, concluded by saying that the opponents 
of forestry cost-share may not have a valid argument.  
The majority of the past research focuses on landowners who have already invested 
in forestry to try to explain and predict their behavior, some including government cost-
share programs and others without. This research analyzes the perspective of a private 
landowner facing an investment decision to either establish new forestland or improve 
existing forestland, and investigates the differences in investment decisions with and 
without cost-share programs. The results will contribute to the question of whether cost-
share programs are only substituting capital that would have been invested in forestry 






compensating private landowners not only by covering the costs of investing in forestry, 
but also by subsidizing the carbon sequestration that results from their forestry 
investment. The analysis is set in the state of Maryland, and the next chapter will present 
an in-depth look at the cost-share programs currently available to landowners there and 







CHAPTER 3. THE ROLE OF FORESTRY PROGRAMS IN MARYLAND’S 
CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES 
3.1 Maryland’s Climate Change Initiatives 
Maryland’s GHGRP, passed in 2012, established an overall goal to reduce GHG 
emissions by 25% (using 2006 as the base year) by 2020 (Department of the 
Environment, 2013). According to the Maryland Department of the Environment (Air 
and Radiation Management Administration, 2011), Maryland has one of the longest tidal 
coastlines (behind Florida, California, and Louisiana), which makes it one of the states 
that is most vulnerable to rising sea levels that result from climate change. There have 
been 20 states, including Maryland, that have implemented GHG emissions targets 
(Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2015). The reduction goals across states 
cannot be directly compared because they have different baseline years and target years. 
However, for some perspective on Maryland’s progressive goals, the state of Connecticut 
has a reduction target of 10% (using 1990 as the base year) by 2020. This is clearly a 
much more conservative goal than the one Maryland has in place.  
Maryland passed several pieces of legislation that led up to the GHGRP of 2012 
(Air and Radiation Management Administration, 2011). The Healthy Air Act, passed in 
2006, included a plan for Maryland to join RGGI. The Maryland Clean Cars Act, passed 
in 2007, implemented stringent emissions standards, and EmPOWER Maryland, passed 
in 2008, was designed to reduce electricity use by providing incentives for homeowners 
to increase their energy efficiency. Further, the Maryland Renewable Energy Portfolio 
Standard, amended in 2008, requires that 20% of the electricity used in Maryland must be 
from renewable sources by 2022.   
The GHGRP plan describes various programs in place to either reduce emissions or 
for offsetting reductions. The programs are divided into the following categories: energy, 




use, and other. Specific to forestry, the action plan focuses on managing forests to capture 
carbon, planting new forests, protecting wetlands to capture carbon, using biomass for 
energy production, and increasing urban trees. The forestry and sequestration efforts are 
projected to result in a reduction of 4.56 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions 
in Maryland by 2020, which is 8.2% of the total reduction goal. In order to reach the 
projected carbon emissions reduction from forestry and sequestration efforts, the DNR in 
Maryland, with help from federal agencies such as the NRCS, has many forestry cost-
share programs in place.  
Maryland’s land is currently around 40% forested, and in 2011, 89.4 million tons of 
carbon was stored by forests in Maryland (Department of the Environment, 2013). Figure 
3.1 shows the three physiographic regions in Maryland, which are determined by major 
geologic landforms. Pine species are common in the Coastal Plain region and a mix of 
northern hardwoods species are common in the Mountain and Piedmont regions 























3.2 United States Forestry Cost-Share Programs 
Forestry practices that are eligible for federal cost-share assistance are a subset of a 
longer list of agricultural conservation practices. The federal conservation programs are 
often intertwined, and this is by no means a comprehensive summary of all programs 
available. This section presents the main program that offers cost-share assistance for 
forestry practices to landowners in Maryland. Other programs such as the Conservation 
Reserve Enhancement Program and the Agricultural Management Assistance Program 
allow some forestry practices, but not nearly as extensively. 
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), administered by the 
NRCS, is a conservation program that provides financial assistance to agricultural 
landowners, including forest landowners, to reduce pollution and improve the state of 
natural resources in Maryland (Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2015). The 
program helps landowners plan and implement conservation practices, such as structural 
changes or management changes, on agricultural or forested land. One of the national 
priorities for EQIP is to increase biological carbon storage and sequestration, which is 
directly relevant for forestry and climate change. The financial assistance is based on the 
average cost to undergo the agreed upon conservation practices. Participants can have 
varying contract lengths depending on the conservation practice, but total assistance is 
limited to $300,000 per person over a six-year period. Examples of eligible conservation 
practices that deal with forests are forest stand improvement, riparian forest buffers, 
forest management plans, and tree and shrub site preparation and establishment. The 
conservation practices must be maintained for the life span of the specific practice, 
according to NRCS standards, which is 15 years for the forestry practices.  
 From 2009 to 2013, forest stand improvements have been conducted on 1,698 
acres in Maryland (Morgart, 2014). Tree and shrub establishments have taken place on 
344 acres, and 24 forest management plans have been executed through EQIP in 
Maryland. These seem like small numbers, but it is important to remember that EQIP 
focuses on many other conservation practices besides forestry. For the 2015 EQIP 




The average EQIP costs for forestry options relevant to this analysis will be included in a 
later chapter that discusses data.  
 
3.3 Maryland Forestry Cost-Share Programs 
Maryland is perhaps one of the more progressive states when it comes to providing 
cost-share assistance to landowners in order to incentivize forestry investments. A 
detailed description of Maryland’s forestry cost-share programs is presented in this 
section, followed by the results of a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) analysis that 
was conducted to shed some light on how much land in Maryland meets the eligibility 
requirements for each program and what the carbon sequestration potential of that land is.   
3.3.1 Woodland Incentive Program 
The Woodland Incentive Program (WIP), administered by the Maryland DNR, 
provides cost sharing to private woodland owners for planting new trees, site preparation, 
and timber stand improvement (Maryland Forest Service, 2008). Anyone who owns 
between 5 and 1,000 acres of woodland and agrees to uphold forestry practices for 15 
years is eligible for this program. The program covers up to 65% of the costs incurred by 
the private landowner for forest management, not to exceed $5,000 per year or $15,000 in 
a 3-year period. The 65% payment is made only after the costs have been incurred by the 
landowner. Eligible costs to improve woodland are thinning, pruning, prescribed burning, 
crop tree release, site preparation for reforestation, herbicide treatments, and seedling 
plantings. The program was put in place as a way of incentivizing the development and 
management of private nonindustrial forests because they provide environmental 
benefits, aesthetic benefits, and habitats for wildlife. From 2007 to 2014, 814 landowners 
have participated in the program for management practices on 24,443 acres (Rider, 
2014). The total cost-share assistance for these 814 participants was $834,803, which is 
an average of $104,350 annually.  
GIS Analysis was used to isolate any patches of land that meet the eligibility 
requirements for WIP2. The data used for this analysis were from the Maryland Carbon 
 






Monitoring System (CMS) Database (Dubayah et al., 2013) and the Maryland Protected 
Lands Map Server (Maryland iMAP, 2014). The CMS data layers used were a statewide 
30 meter resolution canopy cover raster layer, which reports the percentage of canopy 
cover for each cell and a statewide 90 meter resolution carbon sequestration potential 
raster layer, which reports the difference between the total lifetime carbon sequestration 
potential and the current aboveground biomass for each cell. The total lifetime carbon 
sequestration potential was calculated using an ecosystem demography model, which 
assumed that the entire state was restored to its natural vegetation of trees. The iMap data 
layers used were a combination of layers showing land in Maryland that has already been 
conserved in some way, including land that DNR owns and land under easements.  
The process used to determine the patches of land that are eligible for WIP is 
shown in Figure 3.2. First, the cells that were not already in a conservation program and 
had a canopy cover of at least 95% were selected as eligible cells for WIP participation. 
From the eligible cells, polygons of at least 5 acres were selected, and the carbon 












The results showed a total of 736,761 acres of land in Maryland is eligible for WIP, 
and the carbon sequestration potential (excluding current aboveground biomass) on this 
land is approximately 138.8 million metric tons. To provide some context for these 
Eligible Cell Criteria: 
-Conservation Layers = ‘0’ (not conserved) 
-Canopy Cover = >=95% 
Select Patches of Eligible Cells: 
-Any eligible cell that was surrounded on 
all sides by eligible cells was selected 
-Each patch of eligible cells was converted 
to a polygon 
-All polygons >=5 acres were selected 
 




results, the size of Maryland is approximately 8 million acres, of which about 3 million 
acres are forested, and Maryland emitted approximately 97 million metric tons of carbon 
in 2013. In other words, about a year and a half’s worth of total emissions could be 
sequestered on eligible WIP land.  
The eligible land for WIP is much larger than the program participation that has 
been observed. Perhaps, private landowners observe negative net present values of 
improving timberland management, even with the cost-share assistance. The question of 
whether it is due to the size of the cost-share assistance not being large enough will be 
addressed in this analysis. 
3.3.2 Lawn to Woodland 
The L2W Initiative is a new program primarily aimed at afforestation, which is the 
establishment of new forest cover. The program is a joint effort of Maryland DNR and 
the Arbor Day Foundation. According to the advertisement materials for this new 
program, Maryland has nearly one million acres of lawn that could potentially be 
converted to forests (Maryland Forest Service, 2014). This program seeks to plant trees 
on land that is currently lawn, and it fully funds the trees, tree planting, and monitoring 
assistance. Any private landowner with more than one acre of turf qualifies for the 
program. The program was launched in 2104 in four pilot counties, Montgomery, 
Howard, Carroll, and Baltimore, and it is being extended statewide in 2015. In 2014, a 
total of 4,300 trees were planted on 12 sites that totaled 14.6 acres in size (Feldt, 2014).  
Again, GIS analysis was used to isolate patches of lawn that are eligible for this 
program in Maryland, with a specific goal to see where the one million acres of lawn 
estimate came from. The data used for this analysis were the same as for the WIP 
analysis, with the addition of data from the National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD) (Jin et 
al., 2013). The NLCD layer reports the land cover classification for each cell (total of 16 
classifications).  
The process used to determine the patches of land that are eligible for L2W is 
shown in Figure 3.3. First, the cells that were not already in conservation programs, had 
less than or equal to 30% canopy cover, and were classified as ‘21’ in the NLCD layer 




used as the eligibility criteria, but the resulting eligible acres was only around 28,000. In 
reality, most lawn space would have a few trees on it, so 30% canopy cover was chosen 
to account for that. The land cover classification of ‘21’ indicates ‘developed, open 
space,’ which is what most large lawn spaces in the Maryland imagery layer were 
classified as.  It is by no means a perfect choice though because the ‘developed, open 
space’ classification also includes land that is not lawn, such as baseball fields and golf 
courses. However, a choice needed to be made in order to move forward with the 
analysis. From the eligible cells, polygons of at least 1 acre were selected, and the carbon 











The results showed a total of 230,450 acres of land in Maryland is eligible for L2W, 
and the carbon sequestration potential (excluding aboveground biomass) on this land is 
approximately 301.6 million metric tons, which is equivalent to about three years of 
Maryland’s annual emissions. You can see that this result is much lower than the one 
million acre estimate, which could be due to differences in the GIS analyses approaches. 
However, the enormous difference in estimates raises some concerns. Perhaps the state 
overestimated the amount of eligible land for this new program. However, the great effort 
that the state of Maryland makes to promote new forest cover and improve management 
on existing forest cover is undeniable, regardless of the discrepancies in estimated 
eligible land.
Figure 3.3 L2W Eligibility According to GIS Criteria 
Eligible Cell Criteria: 
-Conservation Layers = ‘0’ (not conserved) 
-Canopy Cover <= 30% 
-NLCD = ‘21’ (Developed Open Space) 
Select Patches of Eligible Cells: 
-Any eligible cell that was adjacent to at 
least 3 other eligible cells was selected 
-Each patch of eligible cells was converted 
to a polygon 





CHAPTER 4. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS APPLIED TO FORESTRY 
INVESTMENTS 
4.1 Components Critical to Forestry Investments 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a well-known method for evaluating alternative 
investments and can be used to analyze forestry investment scenarios. This research will 
use CBA to evaluate forestry investments, specifically focusing on the differences in 
returns with and without participation in a government cost-share program. There are a 
few aspects of CBA that are critical to forestry investments, which will be the focus of 
this chapter.  Specifically, since forestry is an abnormally long term investment, 
discounting plays a very important role in the analysis. We already saw the role that 
discounting plays in estimating the social cost of carbon as well. Also, there are different 
methods for determining the optimal rotation length, which can change the results. A 
brief description of the scenarios and sensitivity analysis conducted in this research is in 
order as well. 
 
4.2 Discounting and its Impact on Forestry Investments 
As previously stated, the discount rate reflects the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption now and consumption in the future. It is used to calculate the net 
present value of a stream of future costs and benefits (Greenstone et al., 2013). The 
further the benefits and costs occur in the future, the lower their present value today. This 
becomes especially important for forestry investments because the majority of the costs, 
such as establishment costs and fertilizer treatments, are incurred towards the beginning 
of the time horizon and the benefits from harvesting timber occur much later. When a 
landowner is faced with the decision to invest in something that has substantial upfront 




continue to invest in forestry, which could be attributed to the co-benefits that forestry 
provides, such as aesthetic value, lower pollution levels, and carbon storage.  
Choosing the appropriate discount rate for forestry investments is a somewhat 
controversial matter. As the discount rate increases, the less the future is valued. Kula 
(1988) pointed out that discounting easily wipes away the future benefits from harvesting 
timber, even though the risk that forestry investments will become worthless someday in 
the future is very low. Because of this, some argue that forestry investments should be 
discounted at an especially low rate. However, choosing a specific discount rate just to 
make an investment look appealing does not seem like the best approach, especially since 
one could also argue that investing in forestry can come with substantial risks. Such risks 
might include fluctuating future prices of timber, fire damage, wildlife damage, invasive 
species, and wind or other weather damage. Perhaps forestry investments should be 
discounted the same as any other investment. Moreover, discounting is about the 
opportunity cost of investing elsewhere, and such alternatives are relevant for forestry 
investments as well 
The damages from GHG emissions occur over several decades and the same 
concerns about the longevity of the analysis are evident for estimating the social cost of 
carbon as estimating the private returns from a forestry investment. Consequently, it 
makes sense that the discount rates chosen for this analysis are based on those used by an 
interagency working group consisting of several agencies including the EPA and the 
USDA to estimate the social cost of carbon (2.5%, 3%, and 5%) (Greenstone et al., 
2013). The two higher discount rates (3% and 5%) were chosen to represent historically 
observed interest rates. The 2.5% discount rate was chosen to represent the concern that 
interest rates over time are uncertain and to incorporate the common environmentalist 
view that future outcomes matter. 
Recent low interest rates suggest that 2.5% may actually be the most accurate 
discount rate for social CBA. The interest rate on a 30-year treasury bill on March 13th, 
2015 was 2.7% (United States Department of the Treasury, 2015). However, private 
discount rates are likely higher than social discount rates because interest rates on private 




include a risk premium in addition to valuing current versus future consumption. 
GreenStone Farm Credit Services, which is one of the largest rural lenders in the United 
States, currently offers an interest rate between 4.3% and 6.8% for 30-year fixed 
mortgages on rural homes (GreenStone Farm Credit Services, 2015). The interest rate 
offered on a 30-year fixed loan for a parcel of land over 10 acres is between 5.3% and 
7.8%. These higher values suggest that the 5% discount rate may be the best rate for the 
private CBA, and it might actually be a lower bound for the actual private discount rate 
depending on the risk preferences of the landowner. The concept of private impatience 
becomes evident when discussing the difference between the social and private discount 
rates. From a social planner’s point of view (government’s point of view), the time 
horizon in consideration is much longer than that of a private individual. Because of this, 
private individuals are less patient than social planners and therefore their discount rate is 
higher.  
Results of this research will be presented using all three discount rates (2.5%, 3%, 
and 5%), which will also serve as an illustration for how much discounting impacts the 
analysis of forestry investments. The distinction between typical private and social 
discount rates will also be used to interpret the analysis results. Specifically, 2.5% will 
represent a typical social discount rate, and 5% will represent a typical private discount 
rate. For each discount rate, an NPV will be calculated with and without the forestry 
investment in question. Equation 1 shows the NPV formula used for a typical forestry 
investment, which is the basis for the private CBA conducted in this research. 
𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 = −𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
+ �
𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡
(1 + 𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚)𝑡𝑡




Equation 2 shows the inclusion of benefits from carbon sequestration that result from the 
forestry investment, which is the basis for the social CBA conducted in this research. 
𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 = −𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 
+ �
𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 − 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡
(1 + 𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚)𝑡𝑡







4.3 Determining the Optimal Rotation Length 
The decision on when to harvest timber depends first on the optimization objective 
of the landowner. The two objectives that a landowner can have are to maximize long-run 
growth (a biological optimum) or to maximize long-run net revenue (an economic 
optimum). Another way of looking at the differing objectives is to think of the biological 
optimum as maximizing carbon sequestration and the economic optimum as maximizing 
timber harvest net returns. Economic maturity of forests generally occurs sooner than 
biological maturity because the economic optimum accounts for the concept of earning 
interest on the forest investment (Jacobson, 2008). In other words, calculating the 
biological optimum rotation does not take into consideration that you could invest your 
money elsewhere. Different rotation lengths result depending on which optimization 
objective is used. However, you will see in the analysis results that the difference 
between the biological and economic rotations depends heavily on the species and growth 
rates of the stand.  
4.3.1 Biological Rotation 
Forest stand growth is commonly expressed in terms of volume per acre per year. 
Growth is not constant over the lifetime of a tree. Rather, it grows at an increasing rate 
for a period of time and slows to a decreasing growth rate, producing an S-shaped graph. 
The point when the growth rate is zero is called the biological maximum age. This 


















Between 0 and α, the tree is growing at an increasing rate; between α and β, the tree 
is growing at a decreasing rate; and at β, the biological maximum is achieved because the 
growth rate is zero. When volume growth per acre is averaged over the life of the stand, 
the result is called the mean annual increment (MAI). The MAI is calculated each year by 
taking the total volume of the stand divided by the age of the stand. The year in which the 
MAI is maximized is the optimal biological rotation, and the yield that year is called the 
maximum sustained yield (MSY) (Jacobson, 2008). No costs or benefits are taken into 
account when calculating the optimal biological rotation. Because of this, harvesting at 
the biological rotation definitely maximizes the physical harvest volume, but it might 
result in lower returns than the economically optimal rotation.  
4.3.2 Economic Rotation 
Financial maturity of a forest stand usually occurs earlier than biological maturity 
(Jacobson, 2008). The difference between the optimal biological rotation and the optimal 
economic rotation depends on the growth rate of the timber and the alternative rate of 
return. When these two rates equal each other, it is the optimal time to harvest timber. 




This method of solving for the optimal rotation age is also known as maximizing the land 
expectation value (LEV), which was first proposed by Faustmann (1849). The LEV is the 
net present value (NPV) of a stream of net revenues from an infinite series of optimal 
timber rotations. This optimal economic rotation is commonly known as the Faustmann 
rotation. Figure 4.2 illustrates the difference in rotation length between the optimal 
biological rotation and the optimal economic or “financial” rotation.  
The optimal economic rotation will be the primary rotation used for this analysis, 
but a discussion of how the biological and economic rotations differ will be included as 
well. In Figure 4.2, the difference between the two rotation lengths looks quite 
substantial, which is not always the case (as mentioned earlier). In one of the analysis 
scenarios, the optimal rotations are only one year apart, but in the other scenario the 
economic optimum occurs 20 years before the biological optimum. The difference lies in 











































4.4 The With and Without Analysis Process 
The costs and benefits associated with making a forestry investment vary 
significantly based on the investment in question. An overview of the important costs and 
benefits to consider was presented already in the section on forestry and alternative land 
uses. This section presents an overview of the steps involved in using CBA to analyze 
forestry investment scenarios. An explanation of how our data are used to implement the 
relevant costs and benefits for our scenarios is discussed in the next chapter. 
 




One of the basic approaches to the benefit-cost analysis process is the with-and-
without approach (Campbell & Brown, 2003).  This approach includes opportunity costs, 
which are an important concept in cost-benefit analysis. Undertaking an investment in 
forestry means you are giving up the opportunity to do something else with your land. 
The opportunity cost is quantified in the ‘without’ portion of this approach. If the 
investment benefits from the ‘with’ analysis are greater than the investment opportunity 
costs in the ‘without’ analysis, the investment should be made. In this research, a third 
result is added to the traditional with-and-without approach. For each investment, there 
will be two results for the ‘with’ analysis: one assuming that the landowner participates in 
a forestry cost-share program and one where they do not participate. For each of the three 
scenarios, there is an appropriate forestry cost-share program that the landowner would 
be eligible for. An overview of the three scenarios follows. 
 
4.5 Forestry Investment Scenarios and Sensitivity Analysis 
The next three chapters present a detailed description of how CBA was used to 
assess the three forestry investment scenarios presented in Table 4.1. Each scenario 
coincides with one of the forestry cost-share programs discussed earlier.  
To test how sensitive the investment decisions are to the discount rate chosen, 
results will be presented using the three discount rates discussed in a previous section 
(2.5%, 3%, and 5%). In addition, sensitivity analysis of the carbon price used to calculate 
benefits from carbon sequestration will be conducted. Specifically, results will be 
presented using the actual carbon price from the California Cap-and-Trade Program to 
calculate the benefits from carbon sequestration. These results will be compared to results 
using the social cost of carbon estimates, as calculated by the Interagency Working 
Group discussed earlier, to calculate the benefits from carbon sequestration. The 
appropriate social cost of carbon will be used for each discount rate, since the choice of 
discount rates for this analysis was based off the rates used to report the social cost of 
carbon estimates. Scenario specific sensitivity analysis is conducted as well. For example, 
sensitivity analysis on the cost of pre-commercial thinning in the improving timber 




Table 4.1 Overview of Forestry Investment Scenarios 
Forestry Investment Overview of Scenario 
Improving Timber 
Management 
• 30 acres 
• 4-year-old loblolly pine stand 
• Participate in WIP: Pre-commercially thin pine stand at 
age 4 (year 0 in this scenario), 65% of thinning costs 
covered 
• Timber sold as pulpwood 
• Carbon sequestration calculated using conversion 
factors for softwoods in the Northeastern United States 
Conversion from 
Agricultural Land to 
Forest 
• 17 acres 
• Cropland and pastureland separately considered 
• Oak/hickory stand establishment 
• Participate in EQIP: Cost-share based on average costs 
for high density, mechanical tree planting 
• Timber sold as sawtimber 
• Carbon sequestration calculated using conversion 
factors for hardwoods in the Northeastern United States 
Conversion from 
Lawn to Forest 
• 1 acre 
• Oak/Hickory stand establishment 
• Participate in L2W: 100% of establishment costs 
covered 
• Timber sold as sawtimber 
• Carbon sequestration calculated using conversion 




CHAPTER 5. IMPROVING TIMBER MANAGEMENT: IMPLEMENTATION 
AND RESULTS 
5.1 Scenario Overview 
The setting for this scenario is a private landowner in Wicomico County, Maryland 
who owns 30 acres of loblolly pine that was naturally regenerated following a seed tree 
harvest four years earlier. Naturally regenerated stands utilize the seeds from existing 
trees leftover from the previous harvest (Cunningham, Barry, & Walkingstick, 2008). 
The landowner is facing the decision of whether or not to improve management of the 
stand by pre-commercially thinning. Pre-commercial thinning of loblolly pine stands is 
recommended to be conducted in the first three or four years of growth for the best results 
(Williams, Bohn, McKeithen, & Demers, 2011), which is the basis for assuming the 
investment occurs in year four.  
Pre-commercial thinning is an eligible practice for WIP, which is a program in 
Maryland that provides cost-share assistance for the improvement of existing timber 
stands. Historical data showing participation in WIP between 2007 and 2014 reports that 
the average number of acres amongst program participants is 29.78 (Rider, 2014).  
The base case for this scenario, also called the ‘without’ case, assumes that the 
landowner does not pre-commercially thin the stand. Two ‘with’ cases result from this 
scenario: one assuming the landowner pre-commercially thins without receiving cost-
share assistance from WIP and one assuming the landowner pre-commercially thins and 
participates in WIP. Each piece of individual data needed for the CBA is presented in 
detail, followed by the results showing the NPVs of net revenue streams under different 
assumptions, from the year the pre-commercial thinning investment is made to the year of 




5.2 Loblolly Pine Growth Function 
Loblolly Pine is a common species in the Coastal Plain of Maryland (Highfield & 
Sprague, 2011). Refer back to Figure 3.1 for an illustration of Maryland’s physiographic 
regions (defined by major geologic landforms).  
According to a University of Maryland extension publication about forest thinning, 
the main benefit from pre-commercial thinning is improved timber quality (Stewart & 
Dawson, 2013). Improved timber quality arises because pre-commercial thinning 
removes the inferior trees, which leaves the remaining trees with more resources, 
allowing them to grow faster and larger. Pre-commercial thinning is especially important 
for naturally regenerated loblolly pine stands because it is common for pine stands to 
produce seeds at a very high rate, which leads to overstocked stands (Williams et al., 
2011). Growth curves illustrating the concept that pre-commercially thinned loblolly pine 
stands result in greater timber volumes at harvest are presented next.  
5.2.1 Growth without Pre-commercial Thinning 
The growth function for a loblolly pine stand that has not been pre-commercially 
thinned was taken from a Forest Research Group publication (Lutz, 2011). The annual 
volume in tons per acre for the first 40 years was reported. The growth estimates were 
developed by averaging several growth curves from different forest owners. It is 
specified that no thinnings were applied on this hypothetical stand. For different stages of 
the analysis, the timber volume needs to be in cubic feet per acre (to convert to carbon 
per acre) and cords per acre (to sell as pulpwood). The appropriate volume conversion 
factors are shown below (Nix, 2015). A common measurement for timber volume is 
board feet, which is a board that is one foot in length, one foot wide, and one inch thick. 
One thousand board feet is abbreviated as MBF. It was necessary to convert tons per acre 






























5.2.2 Growth with Pre-commercial Thinning 
The growth function for a loblolly pine stand that has been pre-commercially 
thinned was taken from a Forest Service publication that reports regional cost information 
for different timberland management practices, as well as justifications for investing in 
timberland management, such as pre-commercial thinning (Bair & Alig, 2006). The 
volume in cubic feet per acre in five year increments for a pine stand that had been pre-
commercially thinned was reported, and a fitted equation was used to fill in the annual 
volume measures. Since the volume measures were already in cubic feet per acre, they 
only had to be converted to cords per acre (using equation 2 above).   
Table 5.1 shows the volume measures in cords per acre with and without pre-
commercial thinning that are used in this analysis, and Figure 5.2 shows the plotted 























































1 0 0 
2 2.6 0 
3 3.6 0.5 
4 4.8 2.7 
5 6.3 6.0 
6 8.2 10.0 
7 10.8 14.7 
8 14.0 19.8 
9 17.2 25.1 
10 20.3 30.7 
11 23.3 36.2 
12 26.3 41.6 
13 29.2 46.9 
14 31.9 52.0 
15 34.6 56.7 
16 37.1 61.2 
17 39.5 65.2 
18 41.9 68.9 
19 44.1 72.2 
20 46.2 75.1 
21 48.2 77.6 





5.3 Management Costs 
The only management cost that is different between the ‘with’ and ‘without’ cases 
in this scenario is the inclusion of pre-commercial thinning cost. Other management costs 
including fertilizer, herbicide, and miscellaneous management costs would also be 
incurred by the landowner, but those would not change with the decision to pre-
commercially thin. Since the investment in question is pre-commercial thinning, that is 
the only cost that needs to be considered in the analysis. The analysis is done in real 2010 
dollars, so all of the costs and benefits are converted according to the Producer Price 
Index (PPI) for all commodities (United States Bureau of Labor FRED Economic Data, 






















Figure 5.1 Volume Curves for Loblolly Pine Stands: With and Without Pre-commercial 
Thinning  




commodity prices including prices of sawtimber, pulpwood, and other wood products, 
which makes it suitable for forestry analyses (Gunter & Haney Jr, 1984).  
The Alabama Cooperative Extension System (Alabama A&M University and 
Auburn University) conducts a survey of forest landowners in the Southern United States 
every two years, in which respondents are asked to report their major forestry costs 
(Dooley & Barlow, 2013). Maryland is included in the states that are surveyed. The most 
recent published survey results are from 2012, from which the average pre-commercial 
thinning cost per acre was taken. The authors noted a large variance in responses for pre-
commercial thinning costs, from $38 to $236 per acre. I used the average of these two 
values, which is $137 per acre ($125. 14 per acre in 2010 dollars). Since the range of pre-
commercial thinning costs is so large, sensitivity analysis is conducted using the two 
extremes. The cost is incurred in year zero (stand is four years old) for the ‘with’ cases.  
 
5.4 Optimal Rotation and Timber Benefits 
The difference between the optimal biologic and economic rotations was 
previously discussed. The biologically optimal rotation maximizes the mean annual 
increment (MAI) in tree volume, and it does not take any costs or benefits into 
consideration. The maximized MAI in this scenario occurs when the stand is 26 years old 
without pre-commercial thinning and at 23 years old with pre-commercial thinning. The 
difference in rotation lengths is attributed to the accelerated growth that follows pre-
commercial thinning, which leads to a shorter rotation length.  
For the analysis, the economically optimal rotation lengths were used since the 
landowner’s objective is to maximize timber profits. Faustmann’s  formula (below) that 
calculates the land expectation value (LEV) was used to determine the optimal economic 
rotation lengths with and without pre-commercial thinning (Faustmann, 1849). The LEV 
is an estimate of the net present value (NPV), using continuous discounting, of a stream 
of net revenues from rotations to infinity.  
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𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 = −𝐶𝐶 +
𝐿𝐿(𝐸𝐸) − 𝐶𝐶
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 − 1
       (6) 
C in the equation above is the stand regeneration cost, which was obtained from the 
same Forest Service publication as the loblolly pine growth with pre-commercial thinning 
data (Bair & Alig, 2006). This publication reports regional cost estimates, which were 
produced by combining current and past prices, as well as prices for labor and fuel. For 
the Northeast region, the stand establishment costs for naturally regenerated softwood 
stands was estimated to be $92 per acre ($129.61 per acre in 2010 dollars).  
V(t) is the stumpage value when the stand is t years old. It is calculated by 
multiplying the stumpage price (in dollars per cord) by the timber volume in year t (in 
cords per acre). Stumpage prices are the prices that a logging company pays a landowner 
for the right to harvest their standing trees (J. S. Kays & Bittenbender, 2012). Harvesting 
costs such as cutting and hauling are already accounted for in stumpage prices. A Forest 
Service publication that analyzes the United States timber situation from 1952 to 2050 
reports historic stumpage prices by region and estimates price projections to 2050 
(Haynes, 2003). The 2003 publication is the most recent comprehensive Forest Service 
report of stumpage prices, which may seem outdated. However, since stumpage prices 
are determined on a case by case basis by logging companies, they are difficult to report 
on a frequent basis. The University of Maryland extension service no longer reports 
stumpage prices (as of 2006), and the closest extension services that do are Penn State 
and West Virginia University. When looking at their most recent stumpage prices reports, 
the number of observations raised some concerns. For example, in the most recent West 
Virginia price report (December 2014), the stumpage price for softwood pulpwood in the 
region closest to Maryland was $10.71 per cord ($9.63 per cord in 2010 dollars), but it is 
only based on the results of one survey (Appalacian Hardwood Center, 2014). I decided 
to use the 2003 Forest Service publication because it combined the results of small 
surveys such as the one in West Virginia to produce more robust stumpage price 
estimates. In addition, the price used from Haynes (2003) for softwood pulpwood was 





Loblolly pine is the primary tree species used by the paper industry, so I assumed 
that the harvested timber is sold as pulpwood (Cubbage et al., 2009). Real stumpage price 
increases are predicted to be quite substantial. The softwood pulpwood stumpage price is 
predicted to increase in real terms from $9.24 per cord in 2010 to $36.94 per cord in 2050 
(in 2010 dollars). The drastic increases are estimated to happen between 2030 and 2050 
due to a projected tightening supply of pulpwood. However, since real increases in other 
components such as regeneration and management costs are not considered in this 
analysis, I will assume that there are no real increases in stumpage prices. I used the 2010 
real softwood pulpwood stumpage price of $9.24 per cord to calculate V(t). This equation 
was also used to calculate timber benefits from harvesting. In reality, a few trees per acre 
would be left to provide seed trees for natural regeneration, but that was not accounted 
for in the calculation of timber benefits since the difference would be minimal. 
r is the discount rate, which in the base case is 3%. The discount rate of 3% was 
chosen because it is the middle value of the three discount rates considered in this 
analysis (2.5%, 3%, and 5%).  
The LEV using Equation 6 was calculated for each year (with and without pre-
commercial thinning), assuming the harvest occurred in that year. The year with the 
highest LEV was chosen as the optimal economic rotation length. The resulting optimal 
economic rotation lengths were age 25 without pre-commercial thinning and age 22 with 
pre-commercial thinning. Both economic rotation lengths are one year less than the 
respective biological rotation lengths. Since loblolly pine stands grow so quickly, the 
difference between the economic and biological rotations is minimal. However, in the 
case of an oak/hickory stand, which is presented in the next scenario, the difference is 
much larger.  
 
5.5 Woodland Incentive Program Participation 
Thinning is one of the eligible improved management practices that receives cost-
share assistance from WIP. WIP covers up to 65% of the costs of the improved 
management, so I assumed that 65% of the pre-commercial thinning costs were 




assistance per acre is $81.34 when the average pre-commercial thinning cost of $125.14 
per acre is used. The WIP cost-share assistance is adjusted to be 65% of the two extreme 
pre-commercial thinning costs used for sensitivity analysis as well. The resulting cost 
shares are $22.56 per acre using the minimum pre-commercial thinning cost and $140.12 
per acre using the maximum. The WIP cost-share assistance was adjusted because the 
amount of cost-share the landowner receives is determined after the costs are incurred, 
and it is based on the payment receipts for the management practice undergone as part of 
the program.  
 
5.6 Carbon Sequestration Benefits 
The benefits from carbon sequestration were calculated using a sequence of 
conversions that result in the metric tons of carbon per acre that remain permanently 
sequestered in harvested wood products. The first step was to convert merchantable 
timber volume (in cubic feet per acre) into total above and below ground volume. The 
ratio of total above and below ground volume to merchantable volume for softwood 
species in the Northeast region is 2.193 (Birdsey, 1992). The second step was to convert 
the total volume (in cubic feet per acre) to pounds of carbon per acre. The factor to 
convert loblolly pine in the Northeast region from total volume to carbon is 15.28 
(Birdsey, 1992). The common measurement for carbon is metric tons, which is the unit 
that the social cost of carbon is reported in. To convert carbon from pounds to metric 
tons, pounds are multiplied by 0.00045359 (Environmental Protection Agency, 2004).  
The next step was to calculate the percentage of the carbon that actually remains 
sequestered in the harvested wood products. The process in California Cap-and-Trade 
Program’s forest offset protocol was used to estimate carbon in wood products (Air 
Resources Board, 2011). To account for carbon that is lost during harvest and in the 
processing of wood products, mill efficiency measures were calculated by the California 
Air Resources Board (CARB) for each state. The mill efficiency factor for softwood 
pulpwood in Maryland is 51.3%, which means 48.7% of the original carbon sequestered 
is lost before it can be transferred to wood products. The mill efficiency factors vary from 




products or in landfills for at least 100 years is considered to be permanent by CARB. 
Examples of in-use wood products are furniture, paper products, and wood used in 
construction. Smith, Heath, Skog, and Birdsey (2006) estimated the average carbon 
disposition patterns for saw logs and pulpwood for the United States by regions. For 
softwood pulpwood in the Northeast region, 0.6% remains in in-use wood products after 
100 years, and 8.4% remains in landfills after 100 years. A total of 9% of the original 
carbon sequestered by the loblolly pine stand remains permanently sequestered, so that is 
what was used to calculate the carbon benefits.  
The equation below shows the process of converting timber volume in cubic feet 
per acre to metric tons of carbon permanently sequestered per acre.  
𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚





𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚
𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚
× 51.3% × 9%
=
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚
𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚
      (7) 
As previously discussed, the inclusion of carbon benefits using the Interagency 
Working Group’s social cost of carbon estimates will be compared to the inclusion of 
carbon benefits using the carbon price from the California Cap-and-Trade Program. The 
2015 social cost of carbon estimates in 2010 dollars using 2.5%, 3%, and 5% as discount 
rates are $60.96, $39.57, and $11.76 per metric ton respectively (Interagency Working 
Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013). As mentioned earlier, these social cost of carbon 
estimates increase over time (see Table 2.1). The carbon benefits are quantified here 
using both constant social cost of carbon estimates with the 2015 values and increasing 
social cost of carbon benefits with the corresponding annual value each year. The 
California carbon price on March 9th, 2015 was $12.63 per metric ton, which is $12.14 
per metric ton in real 2010 dollars (Climate Policy Iniative, 2015).The California carbon 
price is very similar to the social cost of carbon estimate using the highest discount rate, 
which is illustrated in the results. 
The tons of carbon sequestered per acre each year were adjusted to determine how 




7. The social cost of carbon estimates and the carbon price were multiplied by the annual 
incremental metric tons of permanently sequestered carbon per acre to calculate the 
annual carbon benefit, which is then discounted appropriately in the final NPV 
calculation for each case. In other words, the annual carbon benefit is only based on the 
carbon that remains permanently sequestered, and the temporary carbon sequestration is 
not valued. The debate about whether temporary carbon sequestration should be viewed 
as a way of mitigating climate change is ongoing. Kirschbaum (2006) claimed that 
temporary carbon sequestration achieves very little impact on mitigating climate change 
and should therefore not be incentivized by policy. In response to Kirschbaum’s paper, 
Dornburg and Marland (2008) argued that temporary carbon sequestration reduces carbon 
in the atmosphere in the short run, which helps “buy time” to pursue long term mitigation 
strategies. Since California’s forestry offset protocol does not value temporary carbon 
sequestration, I chose to do the same.  
 
5.7 Base Case Results 
The net revenue each year was calculated by subtracting the annual costs from the 
annual benefits. There are no quantified private benefits until the harvest year, so the net 
revenues are negative up to that point. The NPV is the discounted value of the stream of 
net revenues from the year of the investment (year zero in this case) to the harvest year 
(year 21 without pre-commercial thinning and year 18 with pre-commercial thinning). It 
is important to remember that the loblolly pine stand is already four years old in year zero 
of this scenario, so the optimal rotation lengths are four years longer than the number of 
years between the pre-commercial thinning investment and the harvest.  
It should be noted that net revenues from timber are taxed using capital gains tax 
rates since timber is a long-term investment. The results shown here are before taxes are 
subtracted, since including taxes would not alter any investment decisions. The results 
would decrease proportionately depending on which tax bracket the landowner falls into.  

















Thinning & WIP 
2.5% $265.25 $282.74 $364.09 
3% $239.49 $248.54 $329.88 
5% $159.91 $139.20 $220.54 
 It is important to note that the NPVs in Table 5.2 only include the pre-commercial 
thinning costs, so the actual net returns to the landowner would be different than these 
since they would pay the establishment and management costs as well. However, the 
investment in question is pre-commercial thinning, not the question of whether to allocate 
land to forest. The landowner had already decided to forest the land four years ago. As 
expected, the NPV with pre-commercial thinning and participation in WIP is higher. 
Even though all of the NPVs are positive, the interesting question is whether the NPVs 
with pre-commercial thinning are greater than those without pre-commercial thinning. 
This will differ depending on which discount rate is used. 
 
5.8 Discount Rate Sensitivity Results 
The difference between the ‘with’ and ‘without’ cases are reported in Table 5.3.  




Additional NPV from Pre-
Commercial Thinning 
Additional NPV from Pre-
Commercial Thinning & WIP 
2.5% $17.49 $98.93 
3% $9.05 $90.39 
5% ($20.72) $60.62 
One can see that the discount rate makes a substantial difference in the landowner’s 
decision of whether to pre-commercially thin. With a discount rate of 5% and no 




with pre-commercial thinning. As discussed earlier, 2.5% is expected to be the best 
representation of a social discount rate, and 5% is closer to a private discount rate. With 
that assumption, private forest landowners would not choose to invest in pre-commercial 
thinning without cost-share assistance from WIP. With participation in WIP, the returns 
per acre from pre-commercial thinning are greater than those without thinning for all 
discount rates. The program seems to provide enough for the landowner to invest in pre-
commercial thinning, but it may depend on the pre-commercial thinning costs.  
 
5.9 Pre-Commercial Thinning Cost Sensitivity Results 
The survey results reporting the per acre pre-commercial thinning costs used for 
this analysis ranged from $38 per acre to $236 per acre ($34.71 and $215.57 per acre in 
real 2010 dollars) (Dooley & Barlow, 2013). For the base case, the average of $125.14 
per acre was used, but the wide uncertainty in pre-commercial thinning costs raises some 
concerns. Table 5.4 reports the difference between the ‘with’ and ‘without’ cases for the 
two extremes of the pre-commercial thinning cost per acre. The pre-commercial thinning 
costs are labeled minimum ($34.71 per acre), average ($125.14 per acre), and maximum 
($215.57 per acre) in Table 5.4.  
Table 5.4 Improving Timber Management Results: Difference in NPVs for Different Pre-





Thinning Cost Per 
Acre 
Additional NPV from 
Pre-Commercial 
Thinning 
Additional NPV from 
Pre-Commercial 
Thinning & WIP 
2.5% 
Minimum $107.92 $130.48 
Average $17.49 $98.83 
Maximum ($72.94) $67.18 
3% 
Minimum $99.48 $122.04 
Average $9.05 $90.39 
Maximum ($81.38) $58.74 
5% 
Minimum $69.71 $92.28 
Average ($20.72) 60.62 




As expected the minimum reported pre-commercial thinning cost per acre yielded 
the highest NPVs and the maximum reported pre-commercial thinning cost per acre 
yielded the lowest NPVs. With the maximum pre-commercial thinning cost and no cost-
share assistance from WIP, the NPV is negative for all three discount rates. However, for 
a discount rate of 5%, participation in WIP just barely outweighs the high per-
commercial thinning cost with an NPV of just $28.97 per acre. Even with cost-share 
assistance from WIP, the landowner may choose not to invest in pre-commercial thinning 
if the costs are at the maximum. The variability in pre-commercial thinning costs 
definitely makes a different in the investment decision. 
 
5.10 Carbon Price Sensitivity Results 
The results below include potential compensation for carbon that remains 
permanently sequestered as a result of investing in pre-commercial thinning. The NPVs 
reported in Table 5.5 and 5.6 are the difference between the NPVs with pre-commercial 
thinning and carbon benefits and the ones without pre-commercial thinning in Table 5.2. 
The carbon benefits in Table 5.5 were calculated using the California carbon price, and 
those in Table 5.6 were calculated using both the constant and increasing social cost of 
carbon estimates for all three discount rates.  
Table 5.5 Improving Timber Management Results: Difference in NPVs Including Carbon 




Additional NPV from Pre-
Commercial Thinning & 
Carbon Benefits 
Additional NPV from Pre-
Commercial Thinning, WIP, & 
Carbon Benefits 
2.5% $46.73 $128.08 
3% $36.80 $118.15 







Table 5.6 Improving Timber Management Results: Difference in NPVs Including Carbon 




Inclusion of the 
Social Cost of 
Carbon Estimates 
Additional NPV from 
Pre-Commercial 
Thinning & Carbon 
Benefits 
Additional NPV from Pre-
Commercial Thinning, 
WIP, & Carbon Benefits 
2.5% 
Constant $164.31 $245.65 
Increasing $197.70 $279.04 
3% 
Constant $99.49 $180.83 
Increasing $125.57 $206.91 
5% 
Constant $1.22 $82.57 
Increasing $7.89 $89.23 
The interpretation of Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 depends largely on the initial goals 
for WIP. If the original goal when implementing the program was to increase carbon 
sequestration, then the cost-share assistance would already be based on the carbon 
benefits. This would mean that the last column in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 would be 
double counting the carbon benefits. The main goal of WIP was to “foster and encourage 
the development, management, and protection of the nonindustrial private woodlands” 
(Maryland Forest Service, 2008). The co-benefits of forestry such as environmental, 
wildlife, and aesthetic benefits are cited in the program information as well, but they are 
not at the forefront. This may indicate that the last column is not double counting 
anything, since the current cost-share assistance is likely not based on societal benefits 
from carbon sequestration. 
For the 2.5% and 3% discount rate results, the carbon benefits using the social cost 
of carbon are much higher than those that use the California carbon price. However, the 
5% discount rate results are almost identical. This is a clear illustration of the importance 
of discounting in both the calculation of the social cost of carbon and in the calculation of 
the discounted net returns for this scenario. With the inclusion of carbon benefits, the 
NPVs with pre-commercial thinning are all positive, even without participation in WIP. 




$2.00 per acre, which highlights the extent of private impatience in this scenario. Looking 
at the 2.5% discount rate results when carbon benefits are included, the investment in pre-
commercial thinning is definitely worth it from society’s perspective. It seems like there 
might be a gap between what is best from society’s point of view and what the landowner 
will actually choose. Perhaps the cost-share assistance should be increased in order to 
encourage private landowners to invest and therefore better society. Table 5.7 shows the 
current cost-share assistance compared with the amount if the cost-share assistance were 
based on the carbon benefits. The values in Table 5.7 are the NPVs of only the annual 
carbon benefits from pre-commercial thinning.  
Table 5.7 Improving Timber Management Results: Comparison of Cost-Share Assistance 















Social Cost of 
Carbon 
Estimate 
2.5% $81.34 $29.25 $146.82 $180.21 
3% $81.34 $27.75 $90.44 $116.52 
5% $81.34 $22.65 $21.94 $28.61 
If the cost-share assistance were based on the 2.5% constant social cost of carbon 
estimate, the assistance per acre would be $146.82, compared to the current assistance of 
only $81.34 per acre. An even higher cost-share assistance would result if it were based 
on the increasing social cost of carbon estimates. The actual subsidies of $81.32 per acre 
are not as large as the carbon benefits provided to society. Further, the values in Table 5.7 
only illustrate what happens when the societal benefits from carbon sequestration are 
used to calculate subsidies, when in reality, many more social benefits arise from the 
forestry investments.  
The 5% discount rate results in Table 5.7 provide an interesting illustration of 
private impatience once again. If the cost-share assistance were based on the valuation of 
carbon benefits from the private point of view, the subsidies would actually be lower than 




and a social perspective result in very different values. If the cost-share assistance were 
based on the avoided damages from society’s perspective (using the 2.5% social cost of 
carbon estimate), the issue of private impatience may be fixed. 
Overall, in all cases where the landowner participates in WIP, the NPVs are 
positive and greater than the comparable NPVs without pre-commercial thinning. This 
indicates the success of WIP in incentivizing landowners to invest in a management 
practice such as pre-commercial thinning that leads to increased timber benefits to the 
landowner and carbon benefits to society. However, basing the cost-share assistance on 
the carbon benefits may lead to higher program participation and acceleration towards 






CHAPTER 6. CONVERSION FROM AGRICULTURAL LAND TO FOREST: 
IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
6.1 Scenario Overview 
The setting for this scenario is a private landowner in Harford County, Maryland 
who is considering converting 17 acres of cropland into an oak/hickory forest stand. The 
landowner currently collects cropland cash rent for the acreage and is wondering whether 
investing in forestry with the goal of harvesting timber in the future would provide a 
greater return. Another alternative considered is that the land is of lower quality, for 
which the pastureland cash rent is collected instead of cropland cash rent.   
Tree stand establishment is one of the eligible practices for EQIP, which is a 
federal conservation program that provides cost-share assistance based on the average 
costs of eligible practices. Historical data showing EQIP participation from 2009 to 2013 
reports that the average number of acres that landowners enrolled for tree establishment 
was 17.04 acres (Morgart, 2014).  
The base case for this scenario, also referred to as the ‘without’ case, assumes that 
the landowner continues to collect cropland or pastureland cash rent for the 17 acres. 
Two ‘with’ cases result from this scenario: one assuming the landowner converts to forest 
without participating in EQIP and one assuming the landowner converts to forest and 
receives cost-share assistance from EQIP for the tree establishment costs.  
 
6.2 Oak/Hickory Growth Function 
Oak/hickory mixed forests are the most common forest type in the state of 
Maryland (Highfield & Sprague, 2011). These forests contain a mix of many species, 
including northern red oak, white oak, chestnut oak, and pignut hickory, and they are 




The Forest Service conducted a survey of 409 plots of fully stocked, even-aged 
oak/hickory stands across a study region extending from Illinois eastward through New 
York that included plots in Maryland (Schnur, 1937). Field measurements were obtained 
from the plots and yield curves were produced for five different site indices: 40, 50, 60, 
70, and 80. A site index is a term used by the Forest Service to indicate the growth 
potential for trees at a specific location. It is most commonly reported as the height of the 
average dominant and co-dominant tree when the stand is 50 years old. In Harford 
County, Maryland the site indices range from 64 to 79, so I used the yield curve for the 
site index of 70 for this analysis (Maryland Watershed Services & Maryland Forest 
Service, 2003).  
The volume per acre in cubic feet was given in five year increments for 100 years 
of stand growth. A fitted polynomial equation was used to fill in the annual volume 
measures. For the purpose of selling hardwood timber, the volume measures needed to be 
converted from cubic feet per acre to MBF per acre to be sold as sawtimber. The 









       (8) 
Table 6.1 shows the volume measures used for this analysis, and Figure 6.1 shows 
the plotted volume curve for the values in Table 6.1. Since oak/hickory stands are slower 









































Adapted from Schnur (1937) 




























6.3 Land Conversion and Management Costs 
Costs to convert agricultural land to forest include site preparation and planting. 
Bair and Alig (2006) reported regional cost estimates, which were also used in the 
previous scenario. Maryland is included in the Northeast region, but some of the costs are 
not reported for every region individually. In cases where the cost was not reported for 
the Northeast region, the Southeast region estimate was used. The Southeast region 
extends north up to Virginia, which borders Maryland. The hardwood site preparation 
cost to convert cropland to forest for the Southeast region was $81.16 per acre ($114.34 
per ace in 2010 dollars). Further, the planting cost for hardwood species in the Southeast 
region was $135.42 per acre ($190.79 per acre in 2010 dollars). The establishment costs 
are incurred in year zero of the investment time frame.  
Management and other costs for this scenario include herbicide treatments, 
fertilizer treatments, miscellaneous management costs, and property taxes. Herbicide, 























fertilizer, and miscellaneous management costs were obtained from the Forest Service 
publication previously discussed (Bair & Alig, 2006). The herbicide cost per acre for 
hardwood species in Southeast region was $58.48 per acre ($82.39 per acre in 2010 
dollars). Planted oak seedlings are susceptible to weeds in the first few years after 
establishment, so in this scenario, the herbicide treatment costs are incurred in year one of 
the investment time frame (Boozer, 2013). The fertilizer cost per acre for hardwood 
species in the Southeast was $14.82 ($20.88 per acre in 2010 dollars). Fertilizing an 
established oak stand every five years is recommended, so the fertilizer treatment cost is 
incurred every five years in this scenario, beginning in year five of the time frame 
(Boozer, 2013). The miscellaneous management cost category includes forest 
management plans, boundary maintenance, fire protection, and surveying, and it is 
estimated on a 10-year basis. For the Southeast region, the miscellaneous management 
estimate for hardwood species was $16.71 per acre ($23.54 per acre in 2010 dollars). 
This estimate is divided by 10 and included on an annual basis beginning in year one 
($2.35 per acre annually).  
In the state of Maryland, any forested land that is under a certified forest 
management plan is assessed at a land value of $187.50 per acre, which is significantly 
less than the average agricultural use assessment value (J. Kays & Schultz, 2002). Since I 
am including the miscellaneous management estimate, which includes a cost for 
management plans, I assumed that the landowner has a certified forest management plan. 
The Harford County property tax rate is 1.042 per $100 in assessed value, and the 
Maryland state property tax rate is 0.112 per $100 in assessed value (Maryland 
Department of Assessments & Taxation, 2015). With an assessment value of $187.50, the 
total county and state property tax per acre is $2.16, which is included annually in the 
‘with’ case. In the base case without conversion to forest, the land would be assessed 
using the average agricultural assessment value of $312.50 per acre. The total county and 
state property tax based on the assessment value of $312.50 per acre for cropland is 
$3.61, which is included annually in the ‘without’ case. 
A summary of the establishment and management costs and the timing of their 











Inclusion in ‘With’ 
Case 
Site Preparation $114.34 - Year 0 
Planting $190.79 - Year 0 
Herbicide $82.39 - Year 1 
Fertilizer $20.88 - Years 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40 
Miscellaneous 
Management $2.35 - 
Annually Beginning 
in Year 1 
Forest Property 
Tax $2.16 - 
Annually Beginning 
in Year 0 
Agricultural Land 
Property Tax $3.61 
Annually Beginning 
in Year 0 - 
(Bair & Alig, 2006) and (Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation, 2015) 
6.4 Optimal Rotation and Timber Benefits 
The maximized MAI in this scenario occurs when the stand is 60 years old, which 
is the biologically optimum rotation for the oak/hickory stand. For the analysis, the 
economically optimal rotation length, which maximizes the LEV, was used since the 
landowner’s objective is to maximize timber profits (refer to Equation 6 in the previous 
chapter).  
C in Equation 6 is the stand regeneration cost, which is the establishment cost in 
this scenario. The site preparation and planting costs discussed in the previous section 
were used as the establishment costs in the LEV equation. Again, the hardwood site 
preparation cost for the Southeast region was $114.34 per acre, and the planting cost for 
hardwood species in the Southeast region was $190.79 per acre (Bair & Alig, 2006). The 
total value for C in the LEV calculations was $305.13.  
V(t) is the stumpage value when the stand is t years old. Oak is commonly sold as 
sawtimber, so I assumed that the harvested timber from this oak/hickory stand is all sold 
as such (Szymanski & Pelkki, 2001). Real hardwood sawtimber stumpage prices are not 




The hardwood sawtimber stumpage price is predicted to increase in real terms from 
$387.87 per MBF in 2010 to $439.59 per MBF in 2050 (in 2010 dollars). Again, I will 
not include any real price increases in this scenario. I used the 2010 real hardwood 
sawtimber stumpage price of $387.87 per MBF to calculate V(t). This equation was also 
used to calculate timber benefits from harvesting.  
The maximized LEV occurs in year 40, which is the economically optimal rotation 
length used for this scenario. This is twenty years sooner than the optimal biologic 
rotation length, which is a substantial difference. The slower growing the trees are, the 
more spread out the biologic and economic rotations are, which is why there is more of a 
difference in rotation lengths in the oak/hickory stand than for the loblolly pine stand 
discussed previously.  
 
6.5 Environmental Quality Inventive Program Participation 
Tree stand establishment is one of the eligible conservation practices that receives 
cost-share assistance from EQIP. The cost-share assistance is based on the average cost to 
undergo the agreed upon conservation practices. Every year, the NRCS releases the 
eligible practices and payment rates. The 2015 payments rates were used in the 
calculation of benefits from EQIP to the landowner in this scenario (Natural Resources 
Conservation Service, 2015).  
There are several tree establishment practices that have varying costs. For example, 
costs for low density hand planting, high density hand planting, and high density 
mechanical planting are reported. The hand planting costs are much higher than the 
mechanical costs. The high density hand planting cost is $2595.81 per acre, as compared 
to the high density mechanical planting cost of $309.43 per acre. Since 17 acres are being 
planted with trees, hand planting seems unlikely, and the cost-share assistance is based on 
what is actually done. For this reason, I assumed the landowner receives cost-share 
assistance based on the cost for high density mechanical planting of $309.43 per acre in 
2015 ($297.51 per acre in 2010 dollars) because this is very close to the actual 




The total EQIP cost-share assistance per acre in the case where the landowner 
participates in the program is $297.51. 
 
6.6 Agricultural Land Rent Benefits 
The average cropland cash rent for the state of Maryland was used to calculate the 
benefits to the landowner in the first ‘without’ case. In 2014, the average cropland cash 
rent in Maryland was $94.50 per acre, which is $84.98 per acre in 2010 dollars (National 
Agricultural Statistics Service, 2014). In reality, a parcel of lesser quality cropland would 
more likely be converted to forest, but the rent values reported are not quality specific. In 
the second ‘without’ case, the average pastureland rent for the state of Maryland was 
used, which was $43.50 per acre in 2014 ($39.12 in 2010 dollars).  
 
6.7 Carbon Sequestration Benefits 
Similar to the previous scenario, the benefits from carbon sequestration were 
calculated using a sequence of conversions that result in the metric tons of carbon per 
acre that remain permanently sequestered in harvested wood products (shown in Equation 
7). The first step was to convert the tree growth from cubic feet per acre to metric tons of 
carbon per acre. The next step was to calculate the percentage of the carbon that actually 
remains sequestered in the harvested wood products. The process from California Cap-
and-Trade Program’s forest offset protocol was explained earlier. The estimated mill 
efficiency for hardwood saw timber is 61.4%. For hardwood sawtimber harvested in the 
Northeast region, 3.5% is estimated to remain in in-use wood products after 100 years, 
and 28.1% remains in landfills after 100 years. A total of 31.6% of the original carbon 
sequestered by the oak/hickory stand remains permanently sequestered, so that is what 
was used to calculate the carbon benefits. The annual carbon benefits were calculated the 
same way as the previous scenario using both constant and increasing social cost of 











𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚
𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚
× 61.4% × 31.6%
=
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚
𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚
      (8) 
 
6.8 Base Case Results 
The base case results for the conversion from cropland to forest are shown in Table 
6.3 below. Again, the NPVs reported here are before capital gains and income taxes are 
subtracted. 









Conversion & EQIP 
2.5% $2124.08 $1,048.91 $1,346.42 
3% $1962.31 $775.30 $1072.81 
5% $1,477.67 $101.08 $398.59 
 All of the base case NPVs are positive, but one can tell by looking at Table 6.3 that 
the returns from receiving cropland rent are much higher than those from conversion. At 
a discount rate of 5%, the returns from converting to forest without cost-share assistance 
are only around $100 per acre, which is a significant decrease from the same result at a 
2.5% discount rate. Since 5% represents a typical private discount rate, the landowner 
would never find it profitable to convert average cropland to forest. As discussed earlier, 
5% may actually be a lower bound to an actual private discount rate, which makes it even 
less likely that the landowner would ever choose to make the conversion in reality. 
 
6.9 Discount Rate Sensitivity Results 
All of the NPVs are positive, but the ‘without’ case has significantly higher returns. 
Table 6.4 shows the difference in NPVs between the ‘with’ cases and the ‘without’ case 










Additional NPV from 
Conversion & EQIP 
2.5% ($1075.17) ($777.66) 
3% ($1,187.01) ($889.50) 
5% ($1,376.59 ($1,079.08) 
Converting the cropland in this scenario to forest results in much lower returns than 
leaving the land in its original agricultural use. The discount rate definitely makes a 
difference in NPVs, but the returns from cropland are higher in all cases. Participation in 
EQIP lessens the difference in NPVs between the ‘with’ and ‘without’ cases, but the 
landowner would still choose to leave the land as cropland. The cropland cash rent would 
need to be as low as $9.17 per acre to make the NPV with conversion equal to the NPV 
without conversion (using 5% as the discount rate). Similarly, if the landowner 
participates in EQIP, the cropland cash rent would have to be $25.56 per acre for the 
NPV with conversion to equal the NPV without conversion. The same results using 2.5% 
as the discount rate are $43.79 per acre (without EQIP participation) and $55.19 per acre 
(with EQIP participation). In reality, a landowner would never convert cropland to forest 
unless it was marginal land. As a proxy for the returns from marginal cropland, the 
average pastureland cash rent in Maryland in 2010 dollars of $39.12 per acre can be used. 
The results using pastureland rent in place of cropland rent are presented next.  
 
6.10 Pastureland Rent Sensitivity Results 
Table 6.5 shows the difference in NPVs between converting the land to forest and 















Additional NPV from 
Conversion & EQIP 
2.5% $122.01 $419.52 
3% ($81.01) $216.50 
5% ($534.74) ($246.23) 
At a discount rate of 2.5%, the conversion to forest results in a higher NPV than 
continuing to collect pastureland rent on the land. However, at a 3% discount rate, the 
conversion is only worth it with cost-share assistance from EQIP. Further, at a 5% 
discount rate, the conversion results in lower NPVs even with participation in EQIP. 
Again, the personal discount rate of the landowner makes a big difference in the 
investment decision, and the private impatience is evident in this scenario when looking 
at the 5% discount rate results. Even though the conversion would be worth it from 
society’s point of view when dealing with pastureland, it would never be worth it from a 
private perspective. However, the conversion from pastureland or marginal land to forest 
is overall more likely than the conversion from cropland to forest.  
 
6.11 Carbon Price Sensitivity Results 
The results below include compensation for carbon that remains permanently 
sequestered as a result of investing in the conversion of agricultural land to forest. The 
NPVs reported in Table 6.6 and 6.7 are the difference between the NPVs with conversion 
and carbon benefits and the base case results without conversion in Table 6.3. Again, 
Table 6.6 calculates carbon benefits based on the California carbon price, and Table 6.7 








Table 6.6 Conversion from Cropland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including 





from Conversion & 
Carbon Benefits 
Additional NPV from 
Conversion, EQIP, & 
Carbon Benefits 
2.5% ($1,027.01) ($729.50) 
3% ($1,144.67) ($847.16) 
5% ($1,350.79) ($1,053.28) 
Table 6.7 Conversion from Cropland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including 





Social Cost of 
Carbon Estimates 
Additional NPV from 
Conversion & Carbon 
Benefits 
Additional NPV from 
Conversion, EQIP, & 
Carbon Benefits 
2.5% 
Constant ($833.44) ($535.93) 
Increasing ($703.64) ($406.13) 
3% 
Constant ($1,049.04) ($751.53) 
Increasing ($954.40) ($656.89) 
5% 
Constant ($1,351.59) ($1,054.08) 
Increasing ($1,328.07) ($1,030.56) 
One can see that even with the inclusion of carbon benefits, the conversion from 
cropland to forest would never overcome the opportunity costs. As before, the 
interpretation of Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 depends on whether the original goal of EQIP 
was to increase carbon sequestration. One of the seven national priorities for EQIP is to 
increase biological carbon storage and sequestration, which may indicate that last column 
in Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 is double counting the carbon benefits. However, even if 
double counting is an issue here, the conversion would still never be worth it to the 
landowner. Similar to the pre-commercial thinning scenario, at a discount rate of 5%, the 
resulting NPV from the inclusion of carbon benefits using the California carbon price are 




The same results using pastureland rent instead of cropland rent are shown in Table 
6.8 and Table 6.9 below.  
Table 6.8 Conversion from Pastureland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including 





from Conversion & 
Carbon Benefits 
Additional NPV from 
Conversion, EQIP, & 
Carbon Benefits 
2.5% $170.16 $467.67 
3% ($38.67) $258.84 
5% ($517.94) ($220.43) 
Table 6.9 Conversion from Pastureland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including 




Inclusion of Social 
Cost of Carbon 
Estimates 
Additional NPV 
from Conversion & 
Carbon Benefits 
Additional NPV from 
Conversion, EQIP, & 
Carbon Benefits 
2.5% 
Constant $363.74 $661.25 
Increasing $493.54 $791.05 
3% 
Constant $56.96 $354.47 
Increasing $151.59 $449.10 
5% 
Constant ($518.75) ($221.23) 
Increasing ($495.22) ($197.71) 
The only case where the inclusion of carbon benefits leads to a different investment 
decision by the landowner is the case of a 3% discount rate and no participation in EQIP.  
For discounts rate of 2.5% and 3%, the inclusion of carbon benefits when the landowner 
participates in EQIP increases the returns from conversion significantly, but the 
landowner would choose to participate without carbon benefits as well. Assuming 5% is 
the most realistic private discount rate, the landowner would likely not choose to convert 




basing the cost-share assistance on the carbon benefits to society instead of the current 
cost-share assistance are shown in Table 6.10. 
Table 6.10 Conversion from Agricultural Land to Forest Results: Comparison of Cost-















Social Cost of 
Carbon 
Estimate 
2.5% $297.51 $48.15 $241.73 $371.53 
3% $297.51 $42.34 $137.97 $232.61 
5% $297.51 $25.80 $25.00 $81.66 
When the cost-share assistance is based on the 2.5% increasing social cost of 
carbon estimate, the cost-share would be larger than it currently is. However, in all other 
cases, even when the cost-share assistance is based on the constant 2.5% social cost of 
carbon estimate, the cost-share is actually higher in its current state. This suggests that the 
cost-share assistance is close to the value of carbon benefits already. In this scenario, 
basing the cost-share assistance on the societal benefits may not induce any greater 
participation. Overall, the program may be more successful by targeting pastureland or 
marginal cropland because the difference in NPVs are positive in some cases when 





CHAPTER 7. CONVERSION FROM LAWN TO FOREST: IMPLEMENTATION 
AND RESULTS 
7.1 Scenario Overview 
The setting for this scenario is a private homeowner in Montgomery County, 
Maryland who is considering converting one acre of lawn into a red oak forest stand. This 
scenario provides insights on homeowners’ preferences for lawn versus forest. The new 
L2W Initiative in Maryland covers all of the costs to establish trees on any patches of 
lawn that are at least one acre in size. All of the seedling and equipment purchases and 
planting are done by the Maryland DNR and the Arbor Day Foundation, so the 
landowner never has to incur any establishment costs. The program was launched in four 
pilot counties in 2014, including Montgomery County. The four species planted in 2014 
as part of this program were red oak, red bud, hazelnut, and persimmon (Feldt, 2014).  
For simplicity, the same volume measures used in the conversion from cropland 
scenario for an oak/hickory stand are used here. 79.7% of the 409 fully stocked, even-
aged oak/hickory plots surveyed by the Forest Service included red oak (Schnur, 1937). I 
assumed that the annual volume measures for the red oak stand established in this 
scenario would be the same as the oak/hickory stand established in the previous scenario. 
The economically optimal rotation length was calculated in the previous chapter as 40 
years, which is used here as well.  
The base case for this scenario, also referred to as the ‘without’ case, assumes that 
the homeowner leaves the one acre as lawn. Two ‘with’ cases result from this scenario: 
one assuming the homeowner converts the lawn to forest without participating in L2W 
and one assuming the homeowner converts the lawn to forest and receives cost-share 
assistance from L2W for the tree establishment costs. The results for the two ‘with’ cases 




harvest timber from one acre of trees, but calculating the revenue from timber harvest 
represents the maximum potential private benefits of establishing forest.  
 
7.2 Establishment and Management Costs 
The establishment costs used for this scenario are mostly the same as those used in 
the establishment of the oak/hickory stand in the previous scenario. The only difference is 
that the hardwood site preparation cost to convert pastureland to forest for the Southeast 
region was used in place of the cost to convert cropland to forest. The cost per acre to 
convert pastureland to forest in the Southeast region was $103.01 per acre ($145.13 per 
ace in 2010 dollars). The planting, herbicide, fertilizer, and miscellaneous management 
costs are identical to the previous scenario: $190.79 per acre, $82.39 per acre $20.88 per 
acre, and $2.35 per acre respectively (Bair & Alig, 2006).  
The property taxes on lawn space would be based on the assessed value of the 
home in reality, but it is difficult to calculate an average assessed value for a home. For 
simplicity, I assumed the one acre of land was assessed as average agricultural land in the 
‘without’ case and forested land under a certified management plan in the ‘with’ cases. 
The Montgomery County property tax rate is 0.732 per $100 in assessed value, and the 
Maryland state property tax rate is 0.112 per $100 in assessed value (Maryland 
Department of Assessments and Taxation 2015). With an assessment value of $187.50 
for forested land, the total county and state property tax per acre is $1.58, which is 
included annually in the ‘with’ case. The total county and state property tax based on the 
average agricultural land assessment value of $312.50 per acre for cropland is $2.64, 
which is included annually in the ‘without’ case. 
Zhou, Troy, Morgan Grove, and Jenkins (2009) conducted an econometric study to 
predict lawn-care expenditures based on demographic and socioeconomic indicators. In 
the process, they collected lawn care expenditures for Baltimore city and Baltimore 
County, Maryland. The average annual total lawn care expenditures were $319.71 in 
2003 ($427.59 in 2010 dollars). The total lawn care expenditures included spending on 
lawn care services, lawn care supplies, equipment repair and rentals, and purchases of 




reported, so this is a rough estimate to include for this scenario. One acre of lawn seems 
to be on the larger end of lawn size, so in reality, the expenditures may be more than 
these. However, I assumed that the annual lawn care maintenance cost is $427.59 per 
acre.  
A summary of the establishment and management costs and the timing of their 
inclusion in the analysis is presented in Table 7.1.  







Inclusion in ‘With’ 
Case 
Site Preparation $145.13 - Year 0 
Planting $190.79 - Year 0 
Herbicide $82.39 - Year 1 
Fertilizer $20.88 - Years 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40 
Miscellaneous 
Management $2.35 - 
Annually Beginning 
in Year 1 
Forest Property 
Tax $1.58 - 
Annually Beginning 




in Year 0 - 
Lawn Care Costs $427.59 Annually Beginning in Year 0 - 
(Bair and Alig 2006)  (Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation, 2015) and 
(Zhou et al. 2009) 
7.3 Lawn to Woodland Participation 
As previously discussed, the L2W Initiative covers 100% of the establishment 
costs. In the case where the homeowner participates in L2W, the site preparation and 
planting costs are zero. In other words, the total cost-share assistance per acre is $335.91. 




7.4 Carbon Sequestration Benefits 
The calculation of the carbon that remains permanently sequestered in harvested 
wood products for this scenario follows the same steps as the conversion from cropland 
to forest scenario. The process used to include carbon benefits in the ‘with’ cases that 
account for timber harvest is identical to the process used in the previous chapter. 
However, the ‘with’ cases in this scenario are also calculated without a timber harvest. 
Without harvesting any timber, the carbon that remains permanently sequestered as a 
result of the conversion to forest is much higher since none of it is released by harvesting. 
To calculate the carbon benefits in the ‘with’ cases that do not account for timber harvest, 
the total metric tons of annual carbon sequestration per acre (refer to equation 8 in the 
previous chapter) were multiplied by the appropriate carbon values. This calculation was 
done every year until the same year as the economically optimal rotation (year 40) to 
make the NPVs with and without timber harvest comparable.   
 
7.5 Base Case Results 
The net revenue each year was calculated by subtracting the annual costs from the 
annual benefits. In the ‘without’ case where the homeowner decides to keep the lawn as 
is, the net revenues in every year are negative since the aesthetic benefits from owning 
lawn are not monetized. Similar to the ‘without’ case, the ‘with’ cases that do not account 
for timber harvest have negative net revenues every year before the inclusion of carbon 
benefits. The base case NPVs are shown in Table 7.2. Lawn to Woodland is abbreviated 
as L2W in the result tables.  
Table 7.2 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Base Case NPVs 
($/acre) 















2.5% ($11,230.18) ($616.41) ($280.50) $1,033.31 $1,369.22 
3% ($10,374.88) ($599.38) ($263.47) $758.54 $1,094.45 




 The base case results show how much more costly lawn is to maintain than forest. 
Conversion to forest also comes with costs, but they are much lower than the lawn 
maintenance costs. In reality, forest management costs would likely be higher than what 
is included in this scenario, but they would likely still be less than the lawn maintenance 
costs. Even without harvesting timber, converting to forest has a higher NPV than 
keeping it in lawn. Without participating in L2W, the homeowner still has enough 
incentive to invest in forestry if they plan on harvesting timber. Overall, on such a small 
piece of land as one acre, the investment decision likely depends more on the aesthetic 
values of lawn versus forest that the homeowner possesses. Large lawn space provides 
numerous benefits such as space for outdoor games and gatherings which cannot be 
estimated. In order for the landowner to decide not to convert to forest, their aesthetic 
value of lawn must be high enough to account for the large difference in NPVs between 
the ‘with’ and ‘without’ cases. Preference for lawn might limit participation in L2W and 
likely varies between landowners.  
 
7.6 Discount Rate Sensitivity Results 
The results in Table 7.3 show the difference in NPVs between the ‘with’ cases and 
the case without conversion to forest. 
Table 7.3 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs 
($/acre) 














2.5% $10,613.77 $10,949.68 $12,263.49 $12,599.40 
3% $9,775.50 $10,111.41 $11,133.42 $11,469.33 
5% $7,264.22 $7,600.14 $7,893.43 $8,229.34 
 In all cases, the homeowner could earn more by converting the lawn to forest.  
These results highlight how costly lawn maintenance is compared to forest maintenance. 




than the ones included in this analysis, they would likely never be high enough to be 
more expensive than the lawn maintenance costs. This is especially true since the lawn 
maintenance cost included here is likely an underestimate as well. The values in Table 
7.3 can be thought of as the aesthetic value of lawn that the landowner would need in 
order to choose not to invest in forestry.  
 
7.7 Carbon Price Sensitivity Results 
The NPVs reported in Table 7.4 (using the California carbon price) and Table 7.5 
(using the constant and increasing social cost of carbon estimates) are the difference 
between the NPVs with carbon benefits and the ones in Table 7.2 without conversion to 
forest. The issue of double counting may be present again here when both the cost-share 
assistance from L2W and the carbon benefits are included. The program information cites 
cleaner water, cleaner air, cooler temperatures, and wildlife diversity as reasons why one 
should participate in the program (Maryland Forest Service, 2014). Since carbon 
sequestration is a component of the cleaner air benefit, the subsidies may already be 
accounting for the carbon benefits. However, the NPVs with conversion to forest were 
already substantially higher than the ‘without’ case, so the possible double counting does 
not impact the investment decision. 
Table 7.4 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including 
Carbon Benefits based on California Carbon Price 
($/acre) 

















L2W, & Carbon 
Benefits 
2.5% $10,861.95 $11,197.86 $12,311.64 $12,647.55 
3% $9,993.72 $10,329.63 $11,175.76 $11,511.67 






Table 7.5 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including 
Carbon Benefits based on Social Cost of Carbon Estimates 
($/acre) 


























L2W, & Carbon 
Benefits 
2.5% 
Constant $11,859.65 $12,195.56 $12,505.22 $12,841.13 
Increasing $12,528.64 $12,864.55 $12,635.02 $12,970.93 
3% 
Constant $10,486,60 $10,822.52 $11,271.39 $11,607.30 
Increasing $10,974.35 $11,310.26 $11,366.03 $11,701.94 
5% 
Constant $7,393.07 $7,728.98 $7,918.43 $8,254.34 
Increasing $7,514.32 $7,850.23 $7,941.95 $8,277.86 
 Since the NPVs with conversion were already so much higher than without 
conversion in all cases, it is difficult to tell how much difference the carbon benefits 
make by looking at Table 7.4 and Table 7.5.  In this case, it makes sense to show the 
actual NPVs including carbon benefits, without comparing them to the NPV without 
conversion. 
Table 7.6 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: NPVs Including Carbon Benefits 
based on California Carbon Price 
($/acre) 













L2W, & Carbon 
Benefits 
2.5% ($368.23) ($32.32) $1,081.46 $1,417.37 
3% ($381.16) ($45.25) $800.88 $1,136.79 





Table 7.7 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: NPVs Including Carbon Benefits 
based on Social Cost of Carbon Estimates 
($/acre) 





















L2W, & Carbon 
Benefits 
2.5% 
Constant $629.47 $956.38 $1,275.03 $1,610.95 
Increasing $1,298.46 $1,634.37 $1,404.84 $1,740.75 
3% 
Constant $111.72 $447.63 $896.51 $1,232.42 
Increasing $599.47 $935.38 $991.14 $1,327.05 
5% 
Constant ($419.50) ($83.59) $105.86 $441.77 
Increasing ($298.25) $37.66 $129.38 $465.29 
 When the carbon benefits are based on the 2.5% and 3% social cost of carbon 
estimates, the conversion from lawn to forest results in a positive NPV, even without cost 
share from L2W. At a discount rate of 5% and including the carbon benefits based on the 
increasing social cost of carbon estimates, the conversion also results in a positive NPV 
without timber harvest. However, it is only when both the current L2W cost-share 
assistance and the carbon benefits are included, which may be double counting.  
Table 7.8 shows the cost-share assistance based on the discounted carbon benefits 
provided by the conversion when no timber is harvested. Table 7.9 shows the cost-share 
assistance based on the carbon benefits and timber harvest. 
Table 7.8 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Comparison of Cost-Share 















Social Cost of 
Carbon 
Estimates 
2.5% $335.91 $248.18 $1,245.87 $1,914.87 
3% $335.91 $218.22 $711.10 $1,198.85 




Table 7.9 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Comparison of Cost-Share 















Social Cost of 
Carbon 
Estimates 
2.5% $335.91 $48.15 $241.73 $371.53 
3% $335.91 $42.34 $137.97 $232.61 
5% $335.91 $25.80 $25.00 $48.52 
Cost-share assistance based on the 2.5% and 3% social cost of carbon estimates 
would be substantially higher than the current cost-share assistance. From society’s 
perspective the conversion is very valuable, but again, the private impatience at a 
discount rate of 5% might stop the private landowner from investing. The current cost-
share assistance at a 5% discount rate is already higher than the carbon benefits from a 
private perspective. Again, the question of whether the government should make up the 
difference by offering larger subsidies in order to increase program participation and 
better society as a whole arises. Since the investment decision in this scenario depends 
largely on the aesthetic values of the landowner, larger subsidies could help outweigh a 





CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
8.1 Overview of Conclusions 
For each scenario, conclusions can be made by comparing the results of the CBA 
with the observed forestry cost-share program participation and the GIS analysis results. 
Further, the results can provide insights on how realistic the goals set forth by Maryland’s 
GHGRP are in regards to the forestry efforts. Figure 8.1 shows how the analysis results 

















Figure 8.1 Progression of Results 
Use private CBA results to 
estimate the individual’s economic 
return or loss from participating in 
a forestry cost-share program 
Compare CBA results to actual 
program participation 
Compare actual participation with 
the program scope according to 
GIS analysis results 
Compare program scope with 
goals set forth by the GHGRP 
Use social CBA results to compare 
current cost-share assistance to the 
social carbon benefits that result 





 A discussion of how the results for each scenario fit together using the flow 
diagram in Figure 8.1 will be presented in the next three sections.  
 
8.2 Improving Timber Management: Synthesis of Results 
The results of the CBA on improving timber management provide some insights on 
the observed WIP participation and the scope of land that is eligible for WIP. The timber 
management improvement in question was pre-commercial thinning of a four-year-old 
loblolly pine stand. With a pre-commercial thinning cost of $125.14 per acre, the 
resulting NPVs are positive in every case except the case with a discount rate of 5% and 
no participation in WIP. Since 5% is likely a representation of a private discount rate, this 
is an indicator that WIP should be successful in inducing improved timber management 
that would not have happened in the absence of the program. Even after adjusting for the 
uncertainty in pre-commercial thinning costs, the NPVs were positive with participation 
in WIP for all discount rates. Cost-share assistance from WIP is enough to result in a 
positive NPV from pre-commercial thinning, even at a discount rate of 5%. From these 
results, one could predict that forest owners would be willing to participate in WIP. 
The average number of acres annually enrolled in WIP, based on data from the past 
eight years, is 3,055 (Rider, 2014). This is actually above the projected goal set forth as 
part of the original program information of enrolling 1,500 to 2,000 acres annually 
(Forest Service, 2008). According to the GIS analysis conducted, there are 736,761 acres 
of land that meet the eligibility requirements for WIP. Participation in WIP has exceeded 
the original program scope, but the number of eligible acres in Maryland greatly exceeds 
the observed enrollment.  
Perhaps landowners are improving timber management without the help of cost-
share programs or they are not specifically managing their forests for maximized timber 
growth. Landowners can pay DNR or other private forest industry firms to assist in 
developing forest stewardship plans, examining planting sites, marking areas in need of 
timber stand improvement, and renting forestry equipment. The extent of participation in 
such services was not gathered as part of this research, so no conclusion can be made on 





landowners interested in improving timber management, WIP definitely provides the 
right incentives to induce participation.  
The permanently sequestered carbon is greater with pre-commercial thinning due to 
accelerated growth following the thinning. WIP is cited as one of the programs in the 
Maryland GHGRP that will help the state meet the 2020 GHG reduction target of 25% 
below 2006 levels by increasing carbon sequestration by forests (Department of the 
Environment, 2013). The CBA results definitely support the claim that pre-commercial 
thinning leads to greater carbon sequestration than in similar stands without thinning. 
According to the GIS analysis, the lifetime carbon sequestration potential of the land that 
is eligible for WIP is about 139 million tons of carbon, which is 188 tons of carbon per 
acre. This is far above the estimated 4.56 million tons of carbon emissions reductions 
from forestry efforts in the GHGRP. However, those two numbers cannot really be 
compared because the estimate from the GHGRP only accounts for reductions between 
2012 and 2020, while the carbon sequestration potential is over the entire plant lifetime. 
If anything, the GIS results provide evidence that the GHGRP estimate of carbon 
reductions due to forestry is reachable through increased participation in WIP.  
When the cost-share assistance is based on the carbon benefits provided to society 
by the investment in pre-commercial thinning, the decision of whether or not to 
participate in WIP does not change. However, it does increase the returns for the 
landowner, which could increase program participation if that benefit accrued to the 
landowner. Cost-share assistance based on the constant 2.5% social cost of carbon 
estimate would be $146.82 per acre, compared to the current cost-share assistance of 
$81.34 per acre. Subsidizing carbon sequestration that results from WIP participation 
would potentially accelerate Maryland’s progress towards the goals laid out by the 
GHGRP. 
  
8.3 Conversion from Agricultural Land to Forest: Synthesis of Results 
The CBA results of the decision to convert cropland to forest are largely in favor of 
leaving the land as cropland. EQIP, administered by the NRCS, provides cost-share 





practices. The conservation practice in question here was establishing new trees on 
cropland. Even with participation in EQIP, the NPVs from conversion to forest are 
around $1,000 per acre less than those of collecting cropland rent at all three discount 
rates (2.5%, 3%, and 5%). Based on these results, one would estimate that participation in 
EQIP for tree establishment would be relatively low.  
From 2009 to 2013, tree establishment through EQIP has only been implemented 
on 344 acres in Maryland, which is as expected based on the CBA results (Morgart, 
2014). According to the national land cover data that was used for the GIS analyses, there 
are around 1.2 million acres of cultivated cropland in Maryland (Jin et al., 2013). 344 
acres is miniscule compared to the total eligible land for EQIP. In reality, lower value 
cropland would be much more likely enrolled in EQIP, but the cropland rent used here 
was an average value. The cropland would have to be worth around 40% less than the 
average cash rent of approximately $85 per acre (2010 dollars) for the landowner to 
establish trees as part of EQIP and not lose money. Perhaps EQIP would be more 
successful if it targeted marginal lands.  
As a proxy for marginal cropland, the average pastureland rent of $39.12 per acre 
was used instead of the cropland rent. There are around 747,000 acres of pastureland in 
Maryland that could potentially be converted to forest. The NPVs with conversion of 
pastureland and EQIP participation were higher for discount rates of 2.5% and 3% than 
those without conversion. However, at a 5% discount rate, the conversion still results in 
lower NPVs even with participation in EQIP. Again, the personal discount rate of the 
landowner makes a big difference in the investment decision. However, the conversion 
from pastureland to forest is definitely more likely than the conversion from cropland to 
forest.  
EQIP is also cited as one of the programs in the Maryland GHGRP that will help 
the state meet the 2020 GHG reduction target by increasing carbon sequestration in 
forests. When carbon benefits are included in the CBA, the NPVs from conversion to 
forest are still significantly lower than those of leaving the land as is. Even in the case of 
using pastureland rent, at a 5% discount rate, the inclusion of carbon benefits still does 





2.5% discount rate, the pastureland should be converted to forest, but the private 
landowner will likely not make the investment. There may be potential for greater EQIP 
participation if the subsidies were increased to make the conversion from pastureland to 
forest a worthwhile investment at a 5% discount rate. Overall, larger subsidies are needed 
to induce landowners to convert any agricultural land to forest. Perhaps targeting land 
that is not committed to agriculture is a better option, which is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
8.4 Conversion from Lawn to Forest: Synthesis of Results 
According to the CBA results, targeting lawn for conversion to forest should yield 
much better results than targeting cropland. In all cases, the NPVs from converting to 
forest are greater than those from caring for lawn, even without harvesting any timber or 
participating in L2W. This is due to the large annual lawn maintenance costs. The 
aesthetic values that the landowner possesses for lawn versus forest become the 
determining factor for participation in a program like L2W because neither land use 
results in large returns to the landowner.  
According to the GIS analysis results, there are 230,450 acres of eligible land for 
L2W, which is much lower than the one million acre estimate set forth as part of the 
program announcement (Forest Service, 2014a). Since the program is new, there is only 
one year of participation data to compare this to. In 2014, around 15 acres were enrolled 
in the program, which seems very small even though the program is new. The seemingly 
slow start to the program could be for a number of reasons. For example, it could be a 
program budget constraint, limited program administration resources, poor 
advertisement, or simply because private landowners do not want to convert their lawn to 
forest. 
The GIS analysis results estimate that the total lifetime sequestration potential of 
the eligible land is about 300 million tons of carbon, which is approximately 1,300 tons 
per acre. This is significantly higher than the carbon sequestration potential per acre on 
the WIP land of 188 tons. This makes sense since the carbon sequestration potential only 





WIP is already forested, so the potential for further sequestration is lower than that of 
land that has not been forested yet.  
The inclusion of carbon benefits in this scenario is enough to outweigh the initial 
negative NPVs from conversion to forest without harvesting timber when the carbon 
benefits are calculated using the 2.5% and 3% social cost of carbon estimates. However, 
for a discount rate of 5%, which is likely more similar to a private discount rate, the 
carbon benefits do not outweigh the negative NPV of investing in forestry without 
harvesting timber, which illustrates the concept of private impatience. When the cost-
share assistance is based on the constant 2.5% social cost of carbon estimate, it is 
$1245.87 per acre, compared to the current cost-share assistance of $335.91 per acre. 
Since the conversion is so valuable from society’s perspective, increasing the cost-share 
assistance to fully internalize the positive external social benefits could increase program 
participation. Overall, from the three scenarios, it appears like increasing investment in 
the L2W program would make the greatest impact on reducing atmospheric carbon.  
 
8.5 Comparison of Carbon Sequestration Potential and Abatement Costs 
This section presents a discussion of the carbon sequestration potential of the 
forestry programs in Maryland and a comparison of the effective marginal abatement 
costs of forestry investments that qualify for each program. From Maryland’s GHGRP, 
the forestry and sequestration efforts between 2012 and 2020 were projected to result in a 
reduction in emissions of 4.56 million metric tons. The GIS analysis results estimated the 
lifetime carbon sequestration potential of all eligible land for each program, which was 
divided into a per acre estimate. This per acre estimate was multiplied by the actual 
program participation over the past few years to estimate how much carbon will be 
sequestered over the lifetime of the land that is already enrolled in each program. Further, 
in the case of L2W, the program implementation materials estimated how much land was 
eligible for the program, so the per acre lifetime carbon sequestration potential estimate 
was also multiplied by the program potential according to DNR. Table 8.1 shows how 






Table 8.1 Carbon Sequestration Potential of Maryland’s Forestry Programs 
(millions of tons of carbon) 
One can see from Table 8.1 that the total lifetime carbon sequestration potential is 
not even close to being realized for any of the programs. Further, the DNR estimated 
carbon sequestration potential of L2W is much higher than the GIS analysis results. 
However, the GIS estimated lifetime carbon sequestration potentials for the three 
programs are still quite substantial. For perspective, the total 2013 Maryland GHG 
emissions was 96.8 million tons, so the total GIS estimated lifetime carbon sequestration 
potential for all three programs is the equivalent of about 30 years of annual emissions. 
Even though the lifetime potentials are far from being realized, the goal set forth by the 
2012 GHGRP for the total forestry and sequestration efforts to result in a reduction of 
4.56 million tons by 2020 appears to be doable. The total lifetime carbon sequestration 
potential for the land already enrolled in the programs is 5.08 million tons. Increasing 
participation in the forestry cost-share programs is definitely a climate change mitigation 
strategy that could be successful.  
The important question is how the abatement costs from the forestry cost-share 
program participants compare to abatement costs from carbon markets. Table 8.2 
compares the abatement costs of each forestry investment to the abatement costs from 
United States carbon markets (California and RGGI) and the marginal damages as 
estimated by the constant and increasing social cost of carbon estimates. The effective 
abatement costs were calculated by dividing the ‘with’ minus ‘without’ NPVs (in dollars 










WIP 4.61 138.82 N/A 
EQIP 
     Conversion of Cropland 






L2W 0.02 301.56 1308.89 





per acre) for each scenario by the total permanently sequestered carbon (in tons per acre) 
that results from the forestry investment. The L2W abatement costs were also calculated 
using just the ‘with’ NPVs to provide a perspective of what happens when the lawn 
maintenance costs are not included as opportunity costs in the calculation. The timing of 
the carbon sequestration is not taken into account in these calculations. 
Table 8.2 Effective Abatement Costs of Forestry Investments 
(2010 $/ton) 
 Discount Rate 
 2.5% 3% 5% 
WIP - Pre-Commercial Thinning ($12.67) ($6.56) $15.02 
EQIP - Agricultural Land Conversion 
     Conversion of Cropland 










L2W - Lawn Conversion 
     With Timber Harvest 
     Without Timber Harvest 
  Excluding Lawn Maintenance Costs 
     With Timber Harvest 



















Marginal Abatement Costs – Carbon Markets 
     California Cap-and-Trade Program 










Marginal Damage - Social Cost of Carbon 
     Constant 











In many cases, the abatement costs for forestry investments are negative, which 
means that those investments are profitable for private landowners at a given discount 
rate. Hence, the existing incentives are enough for the landowner to be willing to make 
the forestry investment, even without extra incentives to sequester carbon. The lawn 
conversion scenarios result in very large negative numbers, which means that the 
potential private benefits are quite substantial from the conversion. Even when the 





costs are still very low. Large positive abatement costs indicate investments that are not 
privately profitable and therefore are not cost-effective mitigation strategies. The only 
cases where the abatement costs of forestry investments are higher than the California 
carbon price are the conversion from agricultural land cases. The only exceptions are the 
conversion from pastureland to forest at the 2.5% and 3% discount rates. Since the 
cropland cash rent is higher than the pastureland cash rent, the abatement costs are higher 
for cropland conversion than for pastureland conversion. 
Table 8.3 shows what the carbon price (California or RGGI) would need to be for 
the private landowner to make the forestry investment in question and gain the monetized 
external benefits from the permanently sequestered carbon that results from the 
investment. In other words, Table 8.3 shows the break-even carbon prices of the three 
forestry investment scenarios. The break-even carbon prices were calculated by 
determining which carbon price sets the ‘with’ minus ‘without’ NPVs equal to zero for 
each forestry investment. The ‘with’ minus ‘without’ NPVs used for the calculations 
were those that include carbon benefits based on the California carbon price. The timing 
of the carbon sequestration is taken into account in Table 8.3, which is different from 
Table 8.2. The carbon sequestered further in the future is discounted back to the 
beginning of the investment, so it is not as valuable. 
Table 8.3 Break-Even Carbon Prices of Forestry Investments 
(2010 $/ton) 
 Discount Rate 
 2.5% 3% 5% 
WIP - Pre-Commercial Thinning ($23.55) ($12.80) $35.64 
EQIP - Agricultural Land Conversion 
     Conversion of Cropland 










L2W - Lawn Conversion 
     With Timber Harvest 
     Without Timber Harvest 
  Excluding Lawn Maintenance Costs 
     With Timber Harvest 























 A positive break-even carbon price indicates that the current carbon price would 
have to increase to that level in order for the landowner to make the forestry investment. 
For example, in the case of conversion from cropland to forest at a typical private 
discount rate of 5%, the carbon price would need to increase to $647.81 per ton before 
the landowner would make the conversion and gain the monetized carbon benefits. 
Again, this illustrates how difficult it is to induce conversion of cropland to forest. In the 
case of conversion from pastureland to forest, the break-even carbon prices are much 
smaller. However, at a discount rate of 5%, the break-even carbon price for conversion 
from pastureland is $255.88, which is still quite large. 
There are many cases where the break-even California carbon price is substantially 
lower than the current California price of around $12 per ton. The main example of this is 
the lawn to forest scenarios, especially when the landowner harvests timber. However, 
even the cases without timber harvest result in large negative break-even carbon prices. A 
negative break-even carbon price indicates that the forestry investment is not contingent 
on participation in the carbon market. The investment is privately profitable without any 
monetized external carbon benefits. Since it is so cheap to sequester carbon by converting 
lawn to forest, pursuing this as a mitigation strategy makes sense for the state of 
Maryland. Further, pre-commercial thinning is relatively cheap as well, especially at the 
2.5% and 3% discount rates. These results suggest that increasing participation in the two 
state-funded programs (WIP and L2W) would be a cost-effective climate change 
mitigation strategy for Maryland. 
 
8.6 Analysis Limitations  
The analysis limitations are largely due to data imperfections and the need to 
condense the actual heterogeneity amongst land and forest stands in Maryland into three 
average case scenarios. The scenarios were region specific to Maryland, but not all of the 
data were region specific. For example, most of the costs taken from Bair and Alig’s 
(2006) regional cost publications were not reported for the Northeast region, so the costs 
for the Southeast region were used. Also, the volume growth measures for loblolly pine 





locational features. Even within the Northeast region, costs may vary significantly 
between states, which is not accounted for in much of the data used. Further, while the 
lawn care maintenance cost was specific to Maryland, the estimate did not account for 
lawn size, so some uncertainty surrounds the NPVs from the base case in the L2W 
scenario. If anything, the lawn maintenance costs were likely lower than they would be in 
reality, since one acre of lawn is quite large. Also, the projected prices from Haynes 
(2003) are outdated even though they seemed like the best available estimates to use. 
Uncertainty in the discount rate is another limitation that is common for most 
analyses of this type. Every landowner has a unique discount rate depending on their 
preferences for future consumption and risk, so assuming that every landowners’ discount 
rate will fall into one of the discount rates I used is a limitation. I assumed that 2.5% was 
a representation of the social discount rate, and 5% represented a private discount rate. 
However, private landowners could just as easily have discount rates much higher than 
5% in reality, which would make the forestry investments even less likely in all scenarios 
and further accelerate the problem of private impatience. This may explain the low 
program participation observed over the past few years. 
The uncertainty in carbon valuation that was discussed in the review of climate 
change economics section also exposes a limitation of this analysis. Uncertainty in future 
damages from carbon emissions as predicted by the IAMs used to estimate the social cost 
of carbon result in estimates ranging from around $12 a ton to $60 a ton for 2010 
(Greenstone et al., 2013). It has been argued by some that these values vastly 
underestimate the true damages from carbon emissions (Moore & Diaz, 2015). Further, 
the majority of carbon prices emerging from markets around the globe are on the low end 
of the social cost of carbon estimates. By using both the social cost of carbon estimates 
and the California carbon prices, some of the uncertainty was accounted for through 
sensitivity analysis.  
Lastly, the inclusion of only the carbon sequestration benefits excludes many other 
important co-benefits from forestry. For example, water quality improvements, wildlife 
habitats, and recreational opportunities could have been included in a social cost benefit 





analysis, the numbers resulting from the social CBA are only a lower bound of the actual 
benefits that forests provide to society. Further, the social benefits discussed here are 
global benefits, not just benefits for the state of Maryland. Regional programs are used in 
this analysis, and in reality, Maryland only realizes a portion of the benefits provided to 
society by the programs. To really deal with climate change problems, other states need 
to be doing what Maryland is doing. To suggest that Maryland needs to invest more in its 
forestry programs is one small piece of what needs to be done to solve the climate change 
problem. 
 
8.7 Future Research and Recommendations 
I plan to present the results of this analysis to employees of the Maryland DNR 
with hopes of providing a private landowner perspective on whether the forestry cost-
share programs provide the right incentives to induce participation. I would like to 
provide guidance to the Maryland DNR on what to emphasize in pushing the programs 
forward. Further, since this research illustrates a potential use of GIS data produced by 
Dubayah et al. (2013) as part of NASA’s CMS program, I hope to increase awareness of 
the value of such data. The GIS analysis provided considerable insights on the actual 
participation relative to the program scope and on the carbon sequestration potential. By 
illustrating the value of carbon monitoring data, the data is more likely to be updated in 
the future. 
 One of the main conclusions from this analysis is that even when the forestry cost-
share programs provide enough incentive to induce participation, the actual participation 
is much less than the potential. Even in cases where the program seems to be providing 
enough incentive for landowners to participate, the uptake of the program seems slow. 
Perhaps there is a budget constraint or limited administrative resources for the program, 
which both could limit participation. One recommendation for the DNR in Maryland is to 
increase advertisement of their forestry cost-share programs. The new L2W program is 
difficult to find on the DNR website, and the WIP advertisement materials do not seem 





In addition to increasing program advertisement, if the cost-share assistance was 
adjusted to include greater compensation for carbon sequestration, program participation 
may be increased. The difference in investment decisions using the 2.5% discount rate 
and 5% discount rate illustrates the idea of private impatience in all scenarios. If the cost-
share assistance fully internalized the external carbon sequestration benefits provided to 
society by the forestry investments, the problem of private impatience may decrease. 
Further work on what motivates program participation is warranted to fully understand 
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 The purpose of this appendix is to present a detailed description of the GIS analysis 
discussed in Chapter 3, which describes the forestry cost-share programs available for 
landowners in Maryland. The GIS analysis was conducted to determine the eligible 
number of acres for WIP and for L2W. As a reminder, anyone who owns between five 
and 1,000 acres of woodland and agrees to uphold improved forestry management 
practices for 15 years is eligible for WIP. Further, any private landowner with at least one 
acre of lawn qualifies for L2W. The eligibility criteria were based on these program 
requirements. Table 1 shows the GIS data sources used in the analysis.  
 GIS data layers are reported in either raster or vector format. Both were used for 
this analysis. Raster data is organized in a matrix of cells, in which each cell has a unique 
value. Vector data is organized in one of the following formats: polygons, lines, or points. 
The first step in the GIS analysis was to convert the polygon layers to raster layers. The 
reason for the conversion was because the eligibility requirements for the cost-share 
programs were first applied to each cell individually, so all of the data needed to be in 
raster format. Once the eligible cells were selected, appropriately sized portions of 
eligible cells were isolated by converting the eligible patches of cells back into polygons 












Appendix Table 1.  GIS Data Sources and Layers Used in Analysis 
Data Source Layers Used Layer Format 
Maryland Carbon 
Monitoring System 
(Dubayah et al., 2013) 
Maryland Statewide Canopy 
Cover 30-meter raster 
Maryland Statewide Carbon 
Sequestration Potential 90-meter raster 
National Land Cover 
Database (Jin et al., 2013) 
Maryland Statewide Land 
Cover Classifications 30-meter raster 
Maryland Protected Lands 
Map Server (Maryland 
iMAP 2014) 
Maryland DNR Owned 
Properties and Conservation 
Easements 
polygon 
Rural Legacy Properties polygon 
Maryland Environmental Trust 
Easements polygon 
Forest Conservation Act 
Easements polygon 




Local Protected Lands polygon 
Private Conservation Lands polygon 
Protected Federal Lands polygon 
Once the polygon layers from the Maryland Protected Lands Map Server were 
converted to raster, they were combined into one layer. The reason for the combination of 
layers was to decrease the number of steps to select eligible cells for each program. In the 
combined layer, any cell with a value of ‘0’ was a piece of land that was not part of any 
of the original polygon layers. In other words, any cell with a value of ‘0’ was not owned 
by DNR or in some sort of conservation easement. The combined layer was named 





Model Builder in ArcMap was used to do the rest of the analysis. The WIP and 
L2W models are very similar. The first goal of the analysis was to calculate a raster layer 
that reported a ‘1’ for all cells of eligible land, according to the criteria for the two 
programs.  
For the WIP model, the criteria were: Conservation Layers = 0 and Canopy Cover 
>= 95%. These criteria select all cells that are privately owned and contain a canopy 
cover of at least 95%. 
For the L2W model, the criteria were: Conservation Layers = 0, Canopy Cover <= 
30%, and NLCD = 21 (Developed, Open Space). Most large lawn spaces in the Maryland 
imagery were classified as ‘developed, open space,’ so that is how this criteria was 
chosen. These criteria select cells that are privately owned, covered by no more than 30% 
canopy cover, and classified as ‘developed, open space.’ Originally, an eligibility 
requirement of 0% canopy cover was chosen, but in reality, most lawn space has a few 
trees on it. For this reason, 30% canopy cover was used to represent lawn that may have 
some trees on it but would definitely be able to accommodate more trees from 
participation in the L2W program.  
The second goal of the analysis was to select only the patches of eligible land that 
met the acreage requirements (5 acres for WIP and 1 acre for L2W). The first step was to 
isolate patches of eligible land since there were so many long strings of cells that passed 
the eligibility criteria but were not actually eligible for the programs. For example, long 
strings of road side trees passed the eligibility criteria for WIP, but they are not actually 
forest patches. This task was accomplished by using the ‘Focal Statistics’ tool. This tool 
calculates a statistic of the values within a specified neighborhood around each cell. By 
using a 3x3 rectangle as the specified neighborhood around each cell, any cell with a 
value of ‘9’ was eligible land that was surrounded on all sides by eligible land. 
For the WIP model, a value of ‘9’ was used as the required criteria, and for L2W, 
any value >= ‘4’ was required. The reason why the L2W value is lower is because the 
acreage requirement is smaller, so it is not as important that a cell is surrounded on all 





The next step was to convert the eligible patches of land into polygons. As 
mentioned earlier, this conversion was made because the patches of eligible cells needed 
to be selected based on their acreage. The easiest way to calculate areas using GIS data is 
to have the data in a polygon format. For the WIP model, all polygons with an area >= 
20,234.3 m2 (5 acres) were selected, and for the L2W model, all polygons with an area 
>= 4,046.9 m2 (1 acre) were selected. By adding the areas of all of the eligible polygons, 
the total number of eligible acres for each program was calculated. 
The third goal of the analysis was to calculate the carbon sequestration potential for 
the selected eligible polygons. This task was accomplished by using the ‘Zonal Statistics’ 
tool. This tool calculates statistics based on values of a raster, within the zones of another 
dataset. In this case, the raster layer used was the Carbon Sequestration Potential layer, 
and the zones were the selected eligible polygons for each program. In other words, the 
carbon sequestration potential values for each cell within each eligible polygon were 
added together in this step, resulting in a total carbon sequestration potential value for 
each polygon. By adding the carbon sequestration potential values for all of the eligible 
polygons, the total carbon sequestration potential was calculated for each program.  
Example results are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The resulting polygons are 
overlaid with Maryland imagery to illustrate that the analysis does in fact select polygons 
that look eligible according to the imagery. In Figure 1, the polygon is part of a large 
forested area (eligible for WIP), and in Figure 2 the polygons are in an urban fringe area 
where the houses are spread out enough to have large lawn space (eligible for L2W). A 
limitation of the L2W results is that certain areas of land meet all of the analysis 
requirements, but they are not actually lawn when they are compared with the imagery. 
For example, golf courses and baseball fields are included in the results.  
The total acreage eligible for each program is 736,761.5 acres for WIP and 230,450 
acres for L2W. The total carbon sequestration potential (excluding current aboveground 
biomass) for each program is 138,816,892 metric tons for WIP and 301,563,830 metric 
tons for L2W. These results indicate that the carbon sequestration potential of the land 
that could be enrolled in either WIP or L2W is quite substantial. It is important to 





sequestered over the lifetime of the trees. In other words, these are not annual values. 
However, over 400 million metric tons could be sequestered on the eligible land, which is 




















































Appendix Figure 2.  Example L2W Analysis Results 
 
 
